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That the individual shall have full protection in person and in property is a
principle as old as common law; but it has been found necessary from time to
time to define anew the exact nature and extent of such protection. Political,
social and economic changes entail the recognition of new rights, and the common
law, in its eternal youth, grows to meet the demands of society.
Samuel D. Warren and Louis D.
Brandeis, HARv. L. Rnv., Vol. 4, p. 193
(1890).

I.

INTRODUCTION

In the past decade we have witnessed the emergence of an impressive array of ideas, activities, and problems related to the psychotherapist-patient relationship. One of the more obvious problems
has been that this relationship is not as readily discernible as that
of a more traditional relationship such as attorney-client, priest-penitent, or husband-wife. In each of these relationships it is not terribly
difficult to ascertain the parties involved. However, the psychotherapist-patient relationship requires elucidation or specificity beyond that of its terms in order to accurately determine who is included
within its parameters.' In the legal setting, "psychotherapist" could
refer to a psychiatrist, psychologist, sexual assault counselor, family
counselor, guidance counselor, or marriage counselor.2 For the purl. Discussions of the extension of the psychotherapist-patient privilege beyond psychiatrists and
psychologists are available. See generally, Development in the Law PrivilegedCommunications,98 HAxv.
L. RE V. 1450, 1530-62 (1985); Comment, FunctionalOverlap Between the Lawyer and OtherProfessionals
Its Implications for the Privileged Communications Doctrine, 72 YALE L.J. 1226 (1962); Fisher, The
PsychotherapeuticProfessionsand the Law of PrivilegedCommunications, 10 WAYNE L. REv. 609 (1964);
Stouder, PennsylvaniaEstablishesNew Privilegefor CommunicationsMade to a Rape Crisis Center Counselor, 55 TmaLEpL.Q. 1124 (1982); Hague, The Psychotherapist-PatientPrivilegein Washington Extending
the Privilege to Community Mental Health Clinics, 58 WASH. L. REV. 565 (1983); Comment, Recommendation Relating to Psychotherapist-PatientPrivilege, 14 CAL. L. REVisiON RPTm. 7 (1977); Knapp,
VandeCreek & Zirkel, PrivilegedCommunicationsfor Psychotherapistsin Pennsylvania:A Time for Statutory Reform, 60 Tom. L.Q. 267 (1987); Stroube, The Psychotherapist-PatientPrivilege: Are Some
PatientsMore Privileged Than Others, 10 PAC. L.J. 801 (1979); Green, The Psychotherapist-PatientPrivilege in Texas, 18 Hous. L. REv. 137 (1980); Comment, Underprivileged CommunicationsExtension of
the Psychotherapist-PatientPrivilege to Patients of Psychiatric Social Workers, 61 CAL. L. REv. 1050
(1973).

2. See, e.g., CAL. Evm. CODE ANN. § 1010 (West 1986) (family and marriage counselor); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-146(k) (West Supp. 1989) (sexual assault counselor); ILL. Rnv, STAT. ch. para.
110 8-802.1 (Supp. 1989) (sexual assault counselor); IowA CODE ANN. § 622.10 (Supp. 1989) (guidance
counselor); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13:3734 (West 1990) (counselor); Mime. STAT. ANN. § 595.020) (West
1988) (sexual assault counselor); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 330-A:16-c (1984) (pastoral counselor); N.C.2
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss1/2
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pose of this article, "psychotherapist" refers to a psychiatrist or
psychologist. 3 "Patient" is also an ambiguous term in the legal context. For the purpose of this discussion, "patient" refers to a person

engaged in individual consultation with a psychotherapist. Thus,

GENq. STAT. § 8-53.5 (1986) (marriage counselor); S.D. CODFED LAws AN. § 19-13-21.2 (1987) (college
counselor); VA. CODE § 8.01-400.2 (1984) (counselor).
Court decisions extend statutory psychotherapist-patient privilege. See Wheelahan v. Wheelahan, 557
So. 2d 1046 (La. App. 1990) (extended to marriage counselor); People v. Foggy, 121 Ill. 2d 337, 521
N.E.2d 86 (1988) (extended to rape crisis counselor); Commonwealth v. Two Juveniles, 397 Mass. 261,
491 N.E.2d 234 (1986) (extended to sexual assault counselor); Clausen v. Clausen, 675 P.2d 562 (Utah
1983) (extended to family and marriage counselor).
3. It has been observed by one commentator that "[t]he principal problem in establishing a privilege
for persons undergoing diagnosis or treatment of a mental or emotional disturbance ... is one of definition." Comment, A Statute to Provide a Psychotherapist-PatientPrivilege, 4 HARv. J. ON LEGis. 307
(1967).
For an example of how courts narrowly interpret psychotherapist-patient privilege statutes, see Elliott
v. Watkins Trucking Co., 406 F.2d 90 (7th Cir. 1969) (court would not extend psychiatrist-patient privilege
to communications between a psychologist and patient); Ritt v. Ritt, 98 N.J. Super. 590, 238 A.2d 196
(1967), rev'd on other grounds, 52 N.J. 177, 244 A.2d 497 (court would not extend psychologist-patient
privilege to communications between a psychiatrist and patient).
Florida's statutes define a psychotherapist as follows:
1. A person authorized to practice medicine in any state or nation, or reasonably believed by
the patient so to be, who is engaged in the diagnosis or treatment of a mental or emotional
condition, including alcoholism and other drug addiction; or
2. A person licensed or certified as a psychologist under the laws of any state or nation, who
is engaged primarily in the diagnosis or treatment of a mental or emotional condition, including
alcoholism and other drug addiction. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.503(a) (West 1979).
Massachusetts defines a psychotherapist as follows:
[A] person licensed to practice medicine who devotes a substantial portion of his time to the
practice of psychiatry or a person who is licensed as a psychologist by the board of registration
of psychologists; or is a registered nurse licensed by the board of registration in nursing whose
certificate of registration has been endorsed authorizing the practice of professional nursing in
an expanded role as a psychiatric nurse mental health clinical specialist.
MAss. GN. LAws ANN. ch. 233 § 20B (West 1989).
4. Statutes vary in the definition of patient. See, e.g., OR. REv. STAT. § 40.230(b) (1989) (A
patient is "a person who consults or is examined or interviewed by a psychotherapist."); CAL. EviD.
CODE ANN. § 1011 (Deering 1986) (A patient is "a person who consults a psychotherapist or submits to
an examination by a psychotherapist for the purpose of securing a diagnosis or preventive, palliative, or
curative treatment of his mental or emotional condition or who submits to an examination of his mental
or emotional condition for the purpose of scientific research on mental or emotional problems.").
The point at which an individual is a patient and is protected by the privilege was given a broad
interpretation. See State v. Miller, 709 P.2d 225 (Or. 1985) (where the defendant spoke with a psychiatrist
over the phone and confessed to a crime and the court held that the psychotherapist-patient privilege
applied, even though the defendant and psychiatrist were strangers to each other). But see State v. Beaty,
762 P.2d 519 (Ariz. 1988) (where a defendant was being treated by a county jail psychiatrist and made
incriminating statements to the psychiatrist outside of their counseling session-the court held that the
privilege did not apply).
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"patient", when referred to in this article, does not include an individual engaged in group therapy.-

A distinction must also be drawn between a communication that
is merely confidential and a communication which is privileged. 6
Confidentiality, in the context of a psychotherapist-patient relationship, is determined normally by professional codes of ethics.7

Breach of confidentiality could subject a psychotherapist to sanctions by the particular profession, as well as civil liability to a patient.8 Privileged communication is a legal, evidentiary phenomenon. 9

5. A few courts have extended psychotherapist-patient privilege to therapy groups. See, e.g., State
v. Andring, 342 N.W.2d 128 (Minn. 1984); Lovett v. Superior Court of Fresno County, 203 Cal. App.
3d 521, 250 Cal. Rptr. 25, (1988); Daymude v. State, 540 N.E,2d 1263 (Ind. App. 1989). For a discussion
of privilege and group therapy, see Cross, Privileged Communications Between Participantsin GroupPsychotherapy, 1970 L. & Soc. ORD. 191 (1970); Note, Group Therapy and Privileged Communication,
43 lIm. L.J. 93 (1967).
6. A few commentators have argued that "[p]rivileged communications are a subset of confidentiality." Knapp, VandeCreek & Zirkel, Privileged Communicationsfor Psychotherapistsin Pennsylvania: A Time for Statutory Reform, 60 Tmap L.Q. 267, 269 (1987). Another commentator has suggested
that "we may define confidentiality as the right of the patient to expect that she/he can communicate
private matters to the therapist and expect that these communications will be kept secret." Paul, Confidentiality And Patients' Records: Balancing the Interests of Society and the Individual, 7 J. Psyci. L.
49, 51 (1979).
For a discussion of confidentiality and psychotherapy, see Slovenko, Psychotherapy and Confdentiality, 24 Ctav. S.L. R.v. 375 (1975); Fleming & Maximov, The Patient or His Victim: The Therapist's
Dilemma, 62 CAL. L. Rnv. 1025 (1974).
7. "Confidentiality is an ethical obligation of one person not to disclose communications made
to him by another." Comment, A State Statute To Provide A Psychotherapist-PatientPrivilege, 4 HARv.
J. oN LEGIs. 307 (1967).
In § 4(2) of the Principles of Medical Ethics with Annotations Especially Applicable to Psychiatry,
it states that "[a] psychiatrist may release confidential information only with the authorization of the
patient or under proper legal compulsion." CODES OF POrassioNAL RgspoNsmarry, 127-148 (R. Gorlin
ed. 1986). Whereas, Principle 5 of the Ethical Principles of Psychologists, states that "[p]sychologists
have a primary obligation to respect the confidentiality of information obtained from persons in the course
of their work as psychologists." Id.
8. For a discussion on civil liability to a patient, see, Eger, Psychotherapists' Liability for ExtrajudicialBreaches of Confidentiality, 18 ARz. L. Rnv. 1061 (1976); Harris, Tort Liability of the Psychotherapist, 8 U.S.F. L. Rar. 405 (1973). For case law see Allen v. Smith, 368 S.E.2d 924 (W. Va.
1988) (where the court acknowledged a tort cause of action for unauthorized release of psychiatric records);
Watts v. Cumberland County Hosp. System, Inc., 75 N.C. App. 1, 330 S.E.2d 242, rev'd, 317 N.C.
321, 345 S.E.2d 201 (1986) (high court only ruled on fraud issue, let stand lower court ruling on breach
of confidentiality); Doe v. Doe, 98 Misc. 2d 201, 400 N.Y.S.2d 668 (1977).
9. "A privilege is a legal power to prevent another from disclosing certain communications by
him to another." Comment, A State Statute to Provide a Psychotherapist-PatientPrivilege, 4 HARv. J.
oN LEGIs. 307 (1967). The word "privilege" has its etymology in the Latin phrase "privata lex" which
loosely means a private law applicable to an individual or a specific group of persons. Slovenko, Psychiatry
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss1/2
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Under a psychotherapist-patient privilege, a patient may shield from
a court of law relevant information given to a psychotherapist. 0
In general, a psychotherapist-patient privilege is applicable to
diagnostic communications and communications directly related to
treatment for an emotional or mental problem." The narrow cor-

and a Second Look at the Medical Privilege, 6 WAYNE L. REv. 175, 181 (1960).
"Privilege was originally conceived of in England as a judicially recognized point of honor among
lawyers, and other gentlemen not to reveal confidential communications." Allred v. State, 554 P.2d 411,
413 (Alaska 1976).
"[R]ules of privilege are not without a rationale. Their warrant is the protection of interests and
relationships which, rightly or wrongly, are regarded as of sufficient social importance to justify some.
sacrifice of availability of evidence relevant to the administration of justice." C. McCoRMCK, EvmENcE,
§ 72 at 171 (Cleary 1984).
10. "There are some kinds of evidence which the law excludes ... because greater mischiefs would
probably result from requiring or permitting its admission, than from wholly rejecting it." GREENLEAF,
A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EviDENcE, Vol. 1 § 236, at 302 (1883). See, e.g., State v. Munyon, 240
Kan. 53, 726 P.2d 1333 (1986) (where psychotherapist-patient privilege prevented defendant from having
access to communication between psychotherapist and victim); People v. Wilkins, 65 N.Y.2d 172, 480
N.E.2d 373, 490 N.Y.S.2d 759, (1985) (where the court held that a psychotherapist could not be compelled
to give testimony regarding statements defendant made with respect to self-inflicted wounds); Tiller v.
State, 159 Ga. App. 557, 284 S.E.2d 63 (1981) (where they prevented the defendant from having access
to mental health record of rape victim); State v. McGautha, 617 S.W.2d 554 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (where
it was held that the trial court committed prejudicial error by admitting statements defendant made to
psychotherapists); Southern Bluecross Mental Health v. Angelucci, 609 S.W.2d 931 (Ky. 1980), aff'd 609
S.W.2d 928 (where the privilege prohibited lower court 'from enforcing an order compelling the production
of defendant's mental health record); State v. Hohman, 136 Vt. 340, 392 A.2d 935 (1978) (where the
court held that the privilege protected written materials psychotherapists used during session with defendant); Commonwealth v. Lamb, 365 Mass 265, 311 N.E.2d 47 (1974) (where the court held that
conversation between psychotherapist and defendant was privileged because defendant was not informed
that the communication would not be privileged); People v. Plummer, 37 Mich. App. 657, 195 N.W.2d
328 (1972) (where it was held to be reversible error in permitting psychotherapist to testify concerning
evaluation of defendant).
11. All psychotherapist-patient privilege statutes provide for exceptions which nullify the privilege
in particular situations. For example, Hawaii's rule reads:
(1) Proceedings for hospitalization. There is no privilege under this rule for communications
relevant to an issue in proceedings to hospitalize the patient for mental illness or substance
abuse, or in proceedings for the discharge or release of a patient previously hospitalized for
mental illness or substance abuse.
(2) Examination by order of court. If the court orders an examination of the physical, mental,
or emotional condition of a patient, whether a party or a witness, communications made in
the course thereof are not privileged under this rule with respect to the particular purpose for
which the examination is ordered unless the court orders otherwise.
(3) Condition an element of claim or defense. There is no privilege under this rule as to a
communication relevant to the physical, mental, or emotional condition of the patient in any
proceeding in which the patient relies upon the condition as an element of the patient's claim
or defense or, after the client's death in any proceeding in which any party relies upon the
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ridor in which the privilege is allowed to exist is due to the time-

honored resentment courts have had for any barrier that conceals
relevant testimony from the bench. 12 Although West Virginia is currently the only state that does not extend an evidentiary privilege

to the psychotherapist-patient relationship," the national development and acceptance of the privilege was not due to judicial sensitivity to the need for such a privilege.' 4 Throughout this country

condition as an element of the party's claim or defense.
(4) Proceedings against physician. There is no privilege under this rule in any administrative
or judicial proceeding in which the competency, practitioner's license, or practice- of the psychologist is at issue, provided that the identifying data of the clients whose records are admitted
into evidence shall be kept confidential unless waived by the client. The administrative agency,
board, or commission may close the proceeding to the public to protect the confidentiality of
the client.
HAw. R. Evm. 504(a) (1985).
12. As stated by a commentator:
For more than three centuries it has now been recognized as a fundamental maxim that the
public (m the words sanctioned by Lord Hardwicke) has a right to every man's evidence ....
From the point of view of society's right to our testimony, it is to be remembered that the
demand comes ... from justice as an institution and from law and order as indispensable
elements of civilized life ....
It follows, on the one hand, that all privileges of exemption from this duty are exceptional,
and are therefore to be discountenanced .... They should be recognized only within the
narrowest limits required by principle.
8 J. Wi oRE, Evnmwxc, § 2192 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
13. See State v. AIlman, 352 S.E.2d 116 (f. Va. 1986); State v. Simmons, 309 S.E.2d 89 (%V.
Va. 1983).
14. States having a psychiatrist and/or psychologist-patient privilege include:
ALA. CODE § 34-26-2 (1985) (both); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32- 2085 (psychologist); CAL. Evm. CODE

§§ 1010-27 (Deering Supp. 1990); Cow. REv. STAT. § 12-43-120 (1985) (psychologist); CoNN. GEM. STAT.
ANN. §§ 52-146c to -e (West Supp. 1990) (both); FA. STAT. ANN. § 90.503 (West 1979) (both); GA.
CODE ANN. §§ 24-9-21, 43-39-16 (1982 & 1988) (both); IDAHo CODE § 54-2314 (1988) (psychologist); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 111, para. 5355 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1990) (psychologist); IND. CODE ANN. § 25-33-1-17
(Burns Supp. 1989) (psychologist); IowA CODE ANN. § 622.10 (West Supp. 1989) (psychologist); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 74-5323 (Supp. 1989) (psychologist); Ky. Rnv. STAT. ANN. §§ 319.111, 421.215 (Michie/
Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1988 & Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1972) (both); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13.3734 (West
Supp. 1990) (both); MD. Crs. & Jun. Poc. ANN. § 9-109 (1989) (both); MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 233, §
10B (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989) (both); Mics. STAT. ANN. 14.15(18237) (Callaghan 1988) (psychologist);
Miss. CODE ANN. § 73-31-29 (1989) (psychologist); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 337.055 (1989) (psychologist); MoNT.
CODE ANN. § 26-1-807 (1988) (psychologist); NEa. Ray. STAT. § 27-504 (1989) (psychologist); NEV. Ray.
STAT. §§ 49.215, 49.235 (1985) (both); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 330-A:19 (Supp. 1989) (psychologist);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:14B-28 (West Supp. 1990) (psychologist); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L.G.R. 4507 (McKinney
Supp. 1990) (psychologist); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53.3 (1986) (psychologist); Omo REv. CODE ANN. §
4732.19 (Anderson 1987) (psychologist); Ox.A. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 § 2503 (West Supp. 1990) (both); OR.
Rv. STAT. § 40.230 (1989) (both); 42 PA. CoNs. STAT. Am. § 5944 (Pardon Supp. 1990) (both); R.I.
GEm. LAws § 5-37.3-3, 5-37.3-6 (1987) (both); S.C. CODE § 19-11-95 (Law Co- op. Supp. 1989) (psychologist); S.D. COD=nan LAwS §§ 19-13-6 to -7 (1987) (both); TaIrt. CODE ANN. §§ 24-1-207, 63-11-
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the psychotherapist-patient privilege was given legal life by the fore-

is a child of
sight and sensitivity of state legislators. 15 The privilege
6
creation.'
law
common
a
statutory origin, not
Although historically there are many reasons why the judiciary
failed to develop a psychotherapist-patient privilege, perhaps the pri-

mary reason had to do with the judiciary's inability to value and
understand the need and importance of the mental health profession

in the fabric of society. Recognition of the centricity of the mental
health profession in this increasingly complex society was a primary
factor in legislative decisions to protect and promote this profession
of a psychotherapist-patient privilege
by enacting some form
17
throughout the country.
At present, neither the legislature nor judiciary of West Virginia
has seen the need and importance of promoting the mental health
213 (Supp. 1990 & 1986) (both); TEx. REV. Cr. STAT. ANN. art. 5561h (Vernon Supp. f990) (both);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-25a-8 (1990) (psychologist); VT. STAT. ANN. fit. 12 § 1612 (Supp. 1989) (psychologist); VA. CODE § 8.01-400.2 (1984) (psychologist); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 18.83.110.(Supp. 1990)
(psychologist); Wis. STAT. Am. § 905.04 (West Supp. 1989) (psychologist); Wyo. STAT. § 33-27-103 (1987)
(psychologist); ALAsHA R. Evm. 504 (both); ARK. R. Evm. 503 (both); DEL. R. EviD. 503 (both); HAw.
R. Evm. 504 to 504.1 (both); ME. R. Evu. 503 (both); N.M. R. Evm. 11-504 (both); N.D. R. Evm.
503 (both).
15. "[A]ny privilege applicable to psychiatrists or psychologists will, with limited exception, be a
legislative creation." D. SHu1A, PsYCHATRIc AND PSYCHOLGICAL EVImENCE 224 (1986).
16. There have been a few American courts that created a common law psychotherapist-patient
privilege. See Note, Confidential Communications to a Psychotherapist a New Testimonial Privilege 47
Nw. U.L REV. 384 n.1 (1952) (citing Binder v. Ruvell, Civil Docket 52C2535, Circuit Court of Cook
County, Illinois, June 24, 1952); Allred v. State, 554 P.2d 411 (Alaska 1976); State v. Evans, 104 Ariz.
434, 454 P.2d 976 (1969) (the court was guided by a privilege statute enacted by the legislature after the
defendant's trial ended).
A few courts have based the privilege on state and federal constitutional grounds. See, e.g., Hawaii
Psychiatric Society v. Ariyoshi, 481 F. Supp. 1028 (D). Haw. 1979); In re B., 482 Pa. 471, 394 A.2d 419
(1978); Caesar v. Mountanos, 542 F.2d 1064 (9th Cir. 1976).
Several English and Canadian courts have used common law grounds to create the privilege. See,
e.g., Henley v. Henley, (1955) 1 All E.R. 590; Pais v. Pals, (1970) 3 All E.R. 491; Kryschuk v. Zulynik,
14 D.L.R.2d 676 (Sask. 1958); Dembie v. Dembie, 21 R.F.L. 46 (Ont. S.C. 76), cited in D. Wmssrm,
274 (1980).
LAW m PSYCHATRY n Tm CANADIAN CONT

17. As one commentator put it:
Rapid technical, social, and economic changes in recent decades have produced criminal behavior
that threatens to overwhelm our system of criminal justice, producing an epidemic of emotional
distress. However, our twin disciplines of law and psychiatry acting together can be responsive
to the needs of society. To do this we will have to evolve not only refinements of the existing
techniques but entirely new ways of viewing our interactive, complementary roles.
Cohen, The Evolutionary Relationship Between Psychiatry and the Law, PsYcmATRY - LAw AND ETcs
72 (A. Carmi ed. 1986).
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profession by creating a psychotherapist-patient privilege.' 8 This article will speak for the mental health profession and the critical need
for action in providing a psychotherapist-patient evidentiary privilege
in West Virginia. Section II of this article will discuss the development of evidentiary privileges in English and American law. Section III will focus on evidentiary privileges in West Virginia. Section
IV will trace the development of the psychotherapist-patient privilege
in American law. Section V will provide a proposed model for a
psychotherapist-patient privilege for the State of West Virginia.
II.

HISToRicAL DEVELOPMENT OF EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGES

It is easier to understand why a new privilege should be created
if we understand why other privileges came about in the past. In
every instance the new privilege reflected a deeply held societal belief
that a particular aspect of human life must be preserved without
intrusion. Privileges are not extralegal but weave as bright threads
through society's legal cloth to border special patterns society has
decided to protect. This is not distrust of a legal system but a perfecting of it; a balancing of equally cherished beliefs: the public
good through public justice and the private good through public
deference. Every society entranced with justice understands its public
domain is founded, upon an equally great, if not greater, private
domain. Privileges are no more than society saying to itself, "Our
foundation will disappear if we do not especially protect this particular human activity."
A. Attorney-Client Privilege
Although a limited number of relationships were recognized as
privileged under Roman law, 19 no solid evidence has been found to

18. The state has a general confidentiality statute. See W. VA. CODE § 27-3-1. However, the statute
has been interpreted as not providing for a psychotherapist-patient privilege. See State v. Simmons, 309
S.E.2d 89 (W. Va. 1983).
19. See Radin, The Privilegeof ConfidentialCommunication Between Lawyer and Client, 16 CAnr.
L. REv. §§ 487-88 (1928).
For a general discussion of the impact of Roman law on English law, see P. Wumaw, Tim Cims
SouRcEs OF ENaLtms LEGAL HIsTORy 54-69 (1925); T. ScRurroN, Tn IFUENCE oF Tim Romm LAW
ON Tan LAW OF ENGLAND (1885, reprint 1985); Cohen, The Origins of the English Bar, 30 LAw Q. Ray.
56 (1915).
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suggest that the English common law attorney-client privilege owes
its development to Roman jurisprudence. 20 It has been suggested by

one commentator that the initial Roman law evidentiary privileges
were based upon "the general moral duty not to violate the un-

derlying [structure] on which family was built." ' 21 That is, early Roman testimonial privileges sought to protect the integrity of the family
by exempting a family member from having to reveal information

about another family member. 22 It was only a matter of time before
the narrow family member testimonial privilege was broadened and

extended to attorneys.2
It has also been suggested that the legitimacy of the Roman attorney-client privilege was never seriously questioned due to a gen-

eral belief that, if an attorney was called upon to testify as to
communication with a client, the attorney "could not be believed
because he had a strong motive for misstatement."' 24 This fear that

20. "That the Roman precedent was the origin of the English rule as far as attorneys are concerned,
cannot be proved." Radin, supra note 19, at 489.
For further discussion of the early history of the English privilege, see Hazard, An HistoricalPerspective on the Attorney- Client Privilege, 66 CAns. L. REv. 1061 (1978); Gardner, A Re- Evaluation
of the Attorney-Client Privilege, 8 Via. L. Rev. 279 (1963); Developments in the Law - Privileged
Communications, 98 HAsv. L. Rev. 1450, 1501-29 (1985); J. WiGmom, supra note 12, § 2290.
21. Radin, supra note 19, at 488. It should be borne in mind that in Roman society a slave was
considered a member of the family that owned him or her. See infra note 25.
22. "At Rome the public policy which supported the privilege was ... directed ... against the
corruption of the family or quasi-family relations which would ensue by making uncertain and suspicious
what was assumed to demand the fullest confidence .... " Id. at 490.
23. Id. at 488. The privilege "received a statutory regulation in the Acilian law on bribery of 123
B.C." Id.
Extending the privilege to the attorney was probably quite logical to the Roman jurist's mind, because
"an attorney for many centuries was considered to be an obedient family servant who managed their
affairs. Because of this relationship, the attorney was highly unlikely to betray his master's confidences."
McKinney, ProposedModel Rule 1.6-Its Effect on a Lawyer's Moral and Ethical Decisions with Regard
to Attorney-Client Confidentiality, 35 BAYLOR L. Rev. 561, 564 (1983).
24. Radin, supra note 19, at 488.
It was suggested by another commentator that the privilege "was based on the irrebuttable presumption that an advocate who would testify against his client was a disreputable person and therefore
not worthy of belief." Alexander, The CorporateAttorney-Client Privilege-A Study of the Participants,
63 ST. JoHN's L. Rev. 191 (1989).
Judicial discussion of the early history of the privilege is also available. See Ex rel. Smith v. Kavanaugh, 513 So. 2d 1138 (La. 1987); Sterling v. Keidan, 162 Mich. App. 88, 412 N.W.2d 255 (1987);
Commonwealth v. Maguigan, 323 Pa. Super. 317, 470 A.2d 611 (1983); State v. Reeves, 444 So. 2d 20
(Fla. 1983); People v. Fentress, 103 Misc. 2d 179, 425 N.Y.S.2d 485 (1980); Ervesun v. Bank of New
York, 99 N.J. Super. 162, 239 A.2d 10 (1968); State v. Land In New Castle County, 57 Del. 40, 193
A.2d 799 (1963).
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an attorney's loyalty to a client 25 would cause the attorney to be
less than candid, if called upon to give testimony regarding confidential communications with a client, undoubtedly is traceable to
the loyalty that was expected between family members.
The attorney-client privilege is generally recognized as the first
English common law privilege. 26 Unlike the justification for the privilege under Roman law, 27 the English privilege was based upon the
28
notion that an attorney would be violating his honor as a gentleman
if he was compelled to reveal information conveyed to him in confidence by a client. 29 The English justification for the privilege did
not appear to be concerned with the question of an attorney being
less than candid in court regarding confidential communication with

25. The foundation of the loyalty concept can be traced to the master-slave relationship that existed
in Rome. A slave was said to have unquestionable loyalty to the master. It was this relationship, masterslave, for which the legal system of Rome initially created a testimonial privilege (and of course the
testimonial privilege next clothed all family members). See Radin, supra note 19, at 488. The fact that
an attorney was considered a servant of the client, probably made it easier for Roman jurists to extend
the privilege and the loyalty rationale to the attorney-client relationship.
26. See I P. TAYLOR, EvmwEcE §§ 911-37 (1920); 9 W. HouswoRSRTH, A -iroty o' ENoLL
LAw 201-02 (1926); C. McCoRmcK, supra note 9, § 87, at 204; J. WViGMoRE, supra note 12, § 2290, at
542 n.1 (Dean Vigmore cited as the first judiciary acknowledgement of the privilege, Berd v. Lovelace,
21 Eng. Rep. 33 (1477), wherein it was held that a "Thomas Hawtry, gentleman, was served with a
subpoena to testify his knowledge touching the cause... yet [he] is a solicitor in this suit ....
[Therefore],
it is ordered that the said Thomas Hawtry shall not be compelled to be deposed.").
It was reported by a commentator that in 1280 an ordinance of the City of London was passed
which dealt with the legal profession, and included a provision allowing lawyers to "refuse to testify as
to confidential communications." H. DIuNm, LEGAL Elmcs 15 (1903). Drinker credited the source of

this ordinance to 6 W. HoLwswoRTH, A HISroRY op ENausm LAw 433 (1924). However, careful reading
of the cite revealed that Holdsworth did not mention the privilege in the context of the ordinance of
1280. A better reading of Holdsworth suggests that he intended only to conclude that the privilege was
recognized in the 16th century. Drinker's questionable interpretation of Holdsworth was cited in In re
Selser, 15 N.J. 393, 403, 105 A.2d 395, 400 (1954).
27. That an attorney could not be trusted to reveal the truth regarding communication held with
a client.
28. In the 17th century admission to the bar in England was controlled by four societies, collectively

called Inns of Court. In 1604 Sir Edward Coke, acting as attorney general, issued an order stipulating
that no law student "be hereafter admitted into the Society of any house of Court that is not a gentleman

by descent." M. LAnDoN, TBE TEmImm op nm LAWYERs 14 (1970). An examination of the admission
registers of three of the societies, revealed that during the 17th century "law students were recruited,
almost without exception, from among the sons of the dominant social and political class of the country,
the landed gentry." Id. at 15. See also W. PRMss, TIM INNs oF CouRT UNDER ElzB'nm I AND Tim
Emmy Si-mrrs 21-46 (1972).
29. Dean Wigmore categorized the privilege as "an objective not a subjective one-consideration for
the oath and the honor of the attorney rather than for the apprehensions of his client." J. \VicMORB,
supra note 12, § 2290, at 543.
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a client. 30 It is plausible to suggest that it is because of the difference
in the Roman and English justifications for the privilege that no
conclusive link has been found to support the speculative idea that
English jurists borrowed the privilege from Roman law.
Aside from being based upon the Elizabethan notion of gentleman's honor, 31 the English privilege was confined solely to the attorney. 32 The client, of course, benefited from the privilege, but the
client could not invoke the privilege.3 3 This fact also points to another difference between the Roman and English privileges. An underlying idea in the English privilege was that an attorney's "honor"
was too important to be sacrificed, by having him testify as to communication with a client. This was especially true if the attorney did
not feel a need to reveal such communications. The English privilege
was not concerned that the client might object to the attorney revealing information given in confidence should the attorney choose
to do so.

4

The Roman privilege appears to have taken the client

into consideration. That is, Roman law recognized an expectation
35
of "loyalty" by the client from the attorney.
36
The foundation or justification for the English privilege shifted
when the idea of "gentleman's honor" lost its appeal or foothold
30. That is the privilege was not created because of a belief that an attorney would lie to the court
about information given in confidence. This point is implicit in the fact that an attorney was accorded
the right to waive the privilege and reveal confidential communication. Dean Wigmore stated, regarding
the waiver, that "the court would not always attempt to judge its standards or to enforce them if the
attorney himself was willing to risk his conscience and his reputation [by revealing confidential communication]." Id. at 545.
31. "The history of this privilege goes back to the reign of Elizabeth I ... ." Id. at 542.
32. Id. at 544.
As one commentator said, "the privilege belonged to the attorney entirely ....
He was thus free
to disclose the communication or to decline, as he saw fit." Gardner, supra note 20, at 289.
33. "The pledge of secrecy had not been taken by him [the client], and therefore the 'point of
honor' was not his to make." J. WiGoan, supra note 12, § 2290, at 544.
It was further pointed out by another commentator that "[t]he client could... be required to testify
as to such communications .. . ." Gardner, supra note 20, at 295.
34. This proposition was still viable or alive in the early 19th century, as evident in Preston Esq.
v. Carr Knt., 148 Eng. Rep. 634 (1826), wherein it was held "that the privilege of an attorney is [not]
the privilege of the client, to the extent that the client himself may avail himself of that privilege, to
avoid discovering communications which passed between him and his solicitor." Id. at 635.
35. "The attorney was not a gentleman in most cases ... and for many centuries was very much
the obedient servant of the family or person whose property he managed and whose affairs he directed
....
The duty of loyalty on the part of servants was an obvious and general one .. . ." Radin, supra
note 19, at 487.
36. Eighteenth
century rationalism
resulted
in the1990
notion that the silence of the attorney was
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in England. 37 When the rationalization for the privilege changed, its

holder also changed. 38 This is to say that the power to invoke the
privilege was taken from the attorney and deposited with the client. 9

The attorney-client privilege received recognition in the United
States during the early nineteenth century. 40 Although its initial adop-

tion in United States jurisdictions was based upon judicial rulings, 4'

the privilege eventually found statutory42 recognition in most jurisdictions.
necessary in order that the client might trust his legal advisor more fully. The attorney's
freedom from compulsion, it was believed, would make the client feel more secure in
disclosing counsel, freely and without fear, all of his knowledge of the case.
Gardner, supra note 20, at 292.
Another commentator assessed the change in the following way:
The policy of the privilege has been plainly grounded since the latter part of the 1700s
on subjective considerations. In order to promote freedom of consultation of legal advisers
by clients, the apprehension of compelled disclosure by the legal advisers must be removed;
hence the law must prohibit such disclosure except on the client's consent. Such is the
modern theory.
J. WiGmoRE, supra note 12, § 2291, at 545.
37. "[B]y the eighteenth century in England the emphasis upon the code of honor had lessened
and the need of the ascertainment of the truth for the ends of justice loomed larger than the pledge
of secrecy." C. McComIcK, supra note 9, § 87, at 204.
It was suggested elsewhere that "Lord Mansfield, in The Duchess of Kingston's Case, explicitly
rejected the honor-based justification because the same rationale might also justify the creation of
a privilege for physician-patient relationships." Developments in the Law-PrivilegedCommunications,
98 HAZv. L. Rnv. 1450, 1502-03 (1985).
Lord Mansfield rejected the honor-based rationale, using the following language. "If a surgeon
was voluntarily to reveal these secrets, to be sure he would be guilty of a breach of honour [sic]
... but, to give that information in a court of justice ...
will never be imputed to him as any
indiscretion whatever." Id. at 1503.
38. "The rule is established for the protection of the client, not of the lawyer." S. PnmsoN,
PHEPsON ON THE LAW OF EviDEcE 203 (9th ed. 1952).
39. "A client ... cannot be compelled, and a legal adviser.., will not be allowed without
the express consent of his client, to disclose oral or documentary communications passing between
them in professional confidence." Id.
40. "There appear to be no American cases on the attorney-client privilege until the 1820's."
Hazard, supra note 20, at 1087. See, e.g., Chirac v. Reinicker, 24 U.S. 280 (1826); Wilson v. Troup,
2 Cow. 195 (1823); Foster v. Hill, 29 Mass. (14 Pick.) 89, 22 A. 400 (1831); Bea v. Quimby, 5
N.H. 94 (1829); Dixon v. Parmelee, 2 Ut. 185 (1829). See generally 97 C.J.S. Witnesses § 276 (1957);
81 Am. JrR. 2D Witnesses § 172 (1976).
41. Common law attorney-client privilege was applied in the following: Trumpold v. Besch,
19 Conn. App. 22, 561 A.2d 438 (1989); Wilson v. Thornton, 416 A.2d 228 (1980); Commonwealth
v. Goldman, 395 Mass. 495, 480 N.E.2d 1023 (1985); Booth Newspapers v. Wyoming City Council,
168 Mich. App. 459, 425 N.W.2d 695 (1988); Barnes v. States, 460 So. 2d 126 (1984); State v.
Elwell, 567 A.2d 1002 (1989); State v. Murvin, 304 N.C. 523, 284 S.E.2d 289 (1981); State v. Juarez,
570 A.2d 1118 (1990); Marshall v. Marshall, 282 S.C. 534, 320 S.E.2d 44 (1984); Commonwealth
v. Edwards, 235 Va. 499, 370 S.E.2d 296 (1988); State v. Burton, 163 W. Va. 40, 254 S.E.2d 129
(1979).
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss1/2
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The privilege, 43 as generally recognized

in the United

STAT. ANN. §§ 12-2234, 13-4062 (1982); CAL. Evm. CoDE ANN. § 954 (Deering 1986); Coto. REv.
STAT. § 13-90-107(b) (1987); FrA. STAT. ANN. § 90.502 (West 1979); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-24
(1982); IDAHO CODE § 9-203 (Supp. 1989); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-1-14-5 (Burns 1990); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 622.10 (West 1990); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-426 (1983); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.210

(Michie Supp. 1988); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13.3734.3 (West Supp. 1990); MD. CTS. & JuD. PRoc.
ANN. § 9-108 (1989); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02 (West 1988); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 491.060 (Vernon
Supp. 1990); MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-1-803 (1988); NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-503 (1989); Nay. REv.
STAT. § 49.035 (1985); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-20 (West 1976); N.Y. CIv. PRAc. L.R. § 4503
(McKinney 1962); Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2317.02 (Anderson 1981); OxLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,
§ 2502 (West 1980); OR. REv. STAT. § 40.225 (9189); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 5928 (Purdon
1982); S.D. CODn=E LAws ANN. § 19-13-3 (1987); TaE. CODE ANN, § 23-3-105 (1980); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 78-24-8 (1987); WAsH. REv. CODE ANN. § 5.60.060 (Supp. 1990); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 905.03 (West 1975); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 1-12-101 (Michie 1989); ALASKA R. Evm. 503; ARK. R.
Evn. 502; DEL. R. EvD. 502; HAw. R. Evm. 503; ME. R. Evm. 502; N.M.R. Evil. § 11-503;
N.R.D. Evm. 502; Tax. R. Ev'D. 503; VT. R. EvrD. 502.
43. Alaska is a state with a typically worded attorney-client privilege statute:
(a) Defintions. As used in this rule:
(1) A client is a person, public officer, or corporation, association, or other organization
or entity, either public or private, who is rendered professional legal services by a lawyer,
or who consults a lawyer with a view to obtaining professional legal services.
(2) A representative of the client is one having authority to obtain professional legal
services and to act on advice rendered pursuant thereto, on behalf of the client.
(3) A lawyer is a person authorized, or reasonably believed by the client to be authorized,
to practice law in any state or nation.
(4) A representative of the lawyer is one employed to assist the lawyer in the rendition
of professional legal services.
(5) A communication is confidential if not intended to be disclosed to third persons
other than those to whom disclosure is in furtherance of the rendition of professional
legal services to the client or those reasonably necessary for the transmission of the
communication.
(b) General Rule of Privilege. A client has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent
any other person from disclosing confidential communications made for the purpose of
facilitating the rendition of professional legal services to the client, (1) between himself
or his representative and his lawyer or his lawyer's representative, or (3) by 1him or his
lawyer to a lawyer representing another in a matter of common interest, or (4) between
representatives of the client or between the client and a representative of the client, or
(5) between lawyers representing the client.
(c) Who May Claim the Privilege. The privilege may be claimed by the client, his guardian
or conservator, the personal representative of a deceased client, or the successor, trustee,
or similar representative of a corporation, association, or other organization, whether or
not in existence. The person who was the lawyer at the time of the communication may
claim the privilege but only on behalf of the client. His authority to do so is presumed
in the absence of evidence to the contrary.
(d) Exceptions. There is no privilege under this rule:
(1) Furtherance of Crime or Fraud. If the services of the lawyer were sought, obtained
or used to enable or aid anyone to commit or plan to commit what the client knew or
reasonably should have known to be a crime or fraud; or
(2) Claimants Through Same Deceased Client. As to a communication relevant to an
same1990
deceased client, regardless of whether.
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States, 44 is deposited with the client, though the attorney may invoke
the privilege on behalf of the client. 45 Today's rationale for the privilege holds that an attorney will only be able to thoroughly represent
a client if the client discloses all information relevant to the legal
problem presented. Further, a client will confide completely in an
attorney only if the client is assured that information disclosed in
confidence will remain with the attorney. 46
As a general proposition, the elements of the privilege 47 have been
stated as requiring that there be a communication made between
privileged persons, in confidence, for the purpose of seeking or providing legal assistance for the client.48 It should be borne in mind
that the privilege is not absolute. All jurisdictions provide for ex-

the claims are by testate or intestate succession or by inter vivos transaction; or
(3) Breach of Duty by Lawyer or Client. As to a communication relevant to an issue
of breach of duty by the lawyer to his client or by the client to his lawyer; or
(4) Document attested by Lawyer. As to a communication relevant to an issue concerning
an attested document to which the lawyer is an attesting witness; or
(5) Joint Clients. As to a communication relevant to a matter of common interest between
two or more clients if the communication was made by any of them to a lawyer retained
or consulted in common, when offered in an action, between any of the clients.
Ax.SKA R. EvID. 503.
44. For a general discussion of the privilege see Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege, 19 U.
RicH. L. Rnv. 559 (1985); Saltzburg, Communications Falling Within the Attorney-Client Privilege,
66 IowA L. REv. 811 (1981); Comment, The Right of a Criminal Defense Attorney to Withhold
Physical Evidence Received from His Client, 38 U. Cm. L. Rav. 211 (1970).
45. See, e.g., N.D. R. EviD. 502(c):
Who may claim the privilege. The privilege may be claimed by the client, his guardian
or conservator, the personal representative of a deceased client, or the successor, trustee,
or similar representative of a corporation, association, or other organization, whether or
not in existence. The person who. was the lawyer or the lawyer's representative at the time
of the communication is presumed to have the authority to claim the privilege but only
on behalf of the client.
46. Saltzburg, Privileges and Professionals-Lawyersand Psychiatris, 66 VA. L. Rav. 597,
605-12 (1980).
47. Dean igmore put forth the following formula for determining when the privilege should
attach:
(I) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal adviser in his
capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence
(5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently (7) from disclosure by himself or by
the legal adviser, (8) except the protection be waived.
J. WVmsoRE, supra note 12, § 2292, at 554.
48. See E. EsaN & M. MARTN, THE ATroRE-CLmNT PRmoE AND Tim WOu-P oDUCT
DoCmlNE, 13-58 (2d ed. 1989).
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ceptions which would permit an attorney to disclose information
49
provided by a client in confidence.

B.

Husband-Wife Communication Privilege
The marriage relationship of husband and wife, to say the least,

is an ancient one. Not so ancient is the effort by courts of law to
treat the spousal relationship as unique by according it special rec-

ognition in judicial proceedings. 50 Over the passage of time courts
have granted the husband-wife relationship three major evidentiary
treatments. The three evidentiary recognitions, in order of legal
creation, are: prohibiting a spouse from testifying against the other
spouse, 51 disqualification of a spouse from testifying on behalf of
53
the other spouse, 52 and privileged marital communication.

Although the primary focus here is privileged. marital communication, its offshoot from the other evidentiary doctrines makes
it appropriate to briefly consider all three doctrines.
The rule prohibiting a spouse from testifying against the other
spouse 54 received its first known legal recognition in England in

49. Id. at 82-95.
50. This is with reference only to special treatment in the area of evidence law.
51. See generally Medine, The Adverse Testimony Privilege-Time to Dispose of a Sentimental
Relic, 67 OR. L. REv. 519 (1988); Note, Partnersin Crime-An Examination of the PrivilegeAgainst
Adverse Spousal Testimony, 22 J. F m. L. 713 (1984) [hereinafter Note, Partners in Crime, Developments in the Law-Privileged Communications98 HAxv. L. REv. 1450, 1563-92 (1985); Note,
Competency of One Spouse to Testify Against the Other in Criminal Cases Where the Testimony
Does Not Relate To Confidential Communications:Modern Trend, 38 VA. L. REv. 359 (1952 [hereinafter Note, Modem Trend]); 8 J. Wioun, EvmEN CE §§ 2227-2245, (rev. ed. 1961); 81 AM. JuR.
2d Witnesses §§ 111-40 (1976).
52. See generally Hutchins & Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence Family
Relations, 13 Mn;N. L. REv. 675 (1929); Mathews, Evidentiary Privileges and Incompetencies of
Husband and Wife, 4 ARK. L. REv. 426 (1949); 2 J. "WGMou, EviDENCE §§ 600-620 (rev. ed.
1979); C. MCCORMICK, EVIDExcE 66 (1984); 97 C.J.S. Witnesses §§ 75-104; 11 P. TAYLOR, EviDENCE
§§ 76-88 (2d Am. ed. 1843); 5 C. CHAmmBPAYNE, EVDmENCE §§ 3655-3662 (1916).
53. See generally The Husband-Wife Privilege of Testimonial Non-Disclosure, 56 Nw. U.L.
REv. 208 (1961) [hereinafter Note, Testimonial Non-Disclosure]; Borden, In Defense of the Privilege
for Confidential Marital Communications, 39 AsuA LAwYEa. 575 (1978); DePrez, Pillow Talk,
Grimgribbersand CunrubialBliss: The Marital Communication Privilege, 56 IND. L.J. 121 (1980);
Houston, Confidential CommunicationsBetween Husband and Wife, 50 Mica. L. R.Ev. 933 (1952);
J. Wi- om, supra note 51, §§ 2332- 2341, at 642-75; C. McCoRwcK, supra note 52, §§ 78-86;
Am. Jut., supra note 51, §§ 148-171, at 188; C.J.S., supra note 52, §§ 266- 275, at 762-82.
54. In its technical use, the rule prohibiting a spouse from testifying against the other spouse
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the sixteenth century.55 Initially, this spousal prohibition was applied only to the wifeA6 That is, the doctrine was formulated to
prohibit only the wife from testifying against the husband. 7 The
precise reason for the initial biased or sexist formulation of the
rule is not known.5 8 -However, it has been offered as a plausible
reason that, during the period the rule was established, a wife was
not considered a vital or prominent part of Elizabethan society. 9
60
The doctrine, however, became gender-neutral by the 1600s.
Numerous justifications have been offered for the recognition
of a rule which prohibits spouses from testifying against each other.6 '

is a privilege. Regarding this, Dean Wigmore remarked that "the application of the privilege has
tended to be obscured by the use of the term incompetency for both the disqualification to testify
on the spouse's behalf and the privilege not to testify against the spouse. The former is plainly an
absolute rule of law, not left to the party's option; the latter is a... privilege." J. WioMoRE, supra
note 51, § 2242, at 256.
Further, this particular privilege goes by various names, e.g., privilege anti-marital testimony,
adverse testimony privilege, and rule of incompetency.
55. Bent v. Allot, 21 Eng. Rep. 50 (1580). In a commentary on this case it was said that
"the wife's testimony on her husband's behalf is treated as receivable, while his privilege to keep
her from testifying against him is apparently sanctioned." J.WIOMORE, supra note 51, § 2227,
at 211.
56. See supra note 55.
57. In the words of Coke, "it hath been resolved by the justices, that a wife cannot be
produced ... against ... her husband." 1 E. COKE, ComtARY UPoN LIrLTON 6b (F.
Hargrave & C. Butler rev. 3 ed. 1812).
58. One commentator has said, regarding the status of a wife during the Elizabethan
period, "Upon marriage the husband and wife became one person in law; that one person was
the husband; the wife, for nearly all legal purposes, became on her marriage a nonentity." Lush,
Changes in the Law Affecting the Rights, Status, and Liabilitiesof MarriedWomen, A CENTURY
OF LAw REFoRM, 342-43 (London 1901).
It was noted by another commentator that "[t]he effect of the rule was to give the husband
complete freedom to torment and punish his wife as long as he took care to do so only when
no one else was present." Note, Modern Trend, supra note 51, at 361.
59. J. Woisooo,
supra note 51, § 2227, at 212.
60. See, e.g., I-COBBErS CoMPLEm COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS, 555 (1811) (citing Lady
Ivys Trial 31 ch. 2 (1684)) (holding "the husband cannot be a witness against his wife ...").
A more complete formulation of the gender-neutral rule was given by Blackstone in his
commentaries, wherein he wrote, "husbands and wives are not admitted to give evidence... against each other ...." W. BLACKSTONE, CoMaNTAIEs ON THE LAWS OF EN LAND
420 (C. Haar 1962).
61. It has been argued "that the values preserved by the exercise of the privilege are more
important than any information to be gathered in violation of it during the examination of one
spouse about the criminal activities of the other." Note, Partners in Crime, supra note 51, at
713.
Further, it has been said that the privilege is "founded upon the belief that the marriage
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Two of the more plausible reasons refer to the danger of destroying
a family by having a spouse testify against the other, 62 and "that
there is a natural repugnance in every fair-minded person to compelling a wife or husband to be the means of the other's condem63
nation."
The initial recognition of the adverse spousal testimony rule in

the United States was by common law. 4 Today, a majority of United
States jurisdictions recognize the rule. 65 In spite of the rule's rec-

ognition in most jurisdictions, its application or formulation is not
consistent in all jurisdictions having the rule. 66
The English case which first recognized the adverse spousal tes-

timony rule67 was also the case which set forth a relatively shortlived rule which said that a spouse could testify on behalf of the
other spouse. 68 It was not until 1628 that recognition was given to
the rule disqualifying a spouse 69 from being able to testify on behalf
is sacred and that nothing should be done to endanger this relationship or the attitude of each
partner toward the other." Comment, Questioning the MaritalPrivilege: a Medieval Philosophy
in a Modern World, 7 Cum. L. Rv. 307, 311 (1976). But see, Lempert, A Right to Every
Woman's Evidence, 66 IowA L. Ra,. 725 (1981), (where it is argued that many of the justifications for the rule are irrational).
62. J. WiGmoRE, supra note 51, § 2228, at 216.
Regarding this rationale, it has been argued that "once a marriage reaches the point where
[a spouse] is willing to testify against [the other] there cannot be much of a marriage left to
save." Lempert, supra note 61, at 732.
63. J. WioMoRE, supra note 51, § 2228, at 217.
64. See e.g., Moody's Lessee v. Fulmer, 3 Grant's Cas. 17 (Pa. 1814) (where it was held
that the trial court was in error in admitting into evidence statements by wife against plaintiffhusband); Tacket v. May 33 Ky. (3 Dana) 79 (1835) (where it was held that the trial court was
in error in admitting testimony of wife against husband); Burlen v. Shannon, 80 Mass. (14 Gray)
433 (1860) (where the court affirmed trial court's refusal to let wife be called as a witness against
husband).
65. For a listing of state statutory provisions, see J. WGmoRE, supra note 52, § 488.
66. See e.g., CoLo. Rnv. STAT. § 13-90-107 (Supp. 1989) (party- spouse must consent to
the testimony); Ky. REv. STAT. AN. § 421.210 (Baldwin 1989) (witness-spouse controls the
privilege); W. VA. CODE § 57-3-3 (1966) (privilege controlled by either the witness or partyspouse). For further examples, see Medine, supra note 51, at 541-42 n.125.
67. See supra note 55.
68. It should be borne in mind that the rule was short lived in England for the time period
in question. It was revived in England during the late 1800's, when the disqualification rule was
abolished completely. J. Wxomoaa, supra note 52, § 602, at 862.
69. The rule of disqualification is considered a disability and not a privilege. The distinction
to kept in mind is that a privilege can be waived, but a disability cannot. Id. § 604, at 863.
There was a second rule of marital disqualification called "Lord Mansfield's Rule", which
prohibited a parent from testifying to nonaccess if the testimony would go to bastardize a child
born in wedlock.
C. McCoRMIcK,
supra
§ 67, at 162.
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of the other spouse. 70 Th~e rule, as initially formulated, 7 ' spoke only
of a wife being disqualified from testifying on behalf of her husband.7 2
Various justifications for the disqualification rule have been put
forth.7 3 It has been offered that the interests of a husband and
wife are the same; therefore, neither could be trusted in testifying
on behalf of the other.7 4 Further, it has been argued that the marriage relationship would be placed in jeopardy by having a spouse
choose between perjury and telling the truth in testifying on behalf
of the other spouse.75
Although the disqualification rule was adopted by the majority
of courts in the United States by the 1800s, 6 today, statutes in the
majority of jurisdictions have made spouses fully competent to testify on each other's behalf in civil proceedings. 7 7 "[Tihe disqualification of the husband or wife to testify for the accused spouse
79
has been removed ' 7 8 in criminal cases .
The husband-wife communication privilege was first recognized
in 1684.80 However, the privilege was relatively dormant during the

70. See W. HoLDswoRTa, supra note 26, at 197.
71. Coke is credited with having formulated the rule in the same sentence in which he
spoke of the rule prohibiting a spouse from testifying against the other spouse. See J.WloMoa,
supra note 52, § 600, at 856. In Coke's words, "it hath been resolved by the justices, that a
wife cannot be produced either against or for her husband ...." E. CoKE, supra note 57.
72. By the time of Blackstone's commentary the rule included both husband and wife.
"[H]usbands and wives are not admitted to give evidence for or against each other ...." W.
BL.AcKSToNE, supra note 60.
73. Holdsworth agreed with Coke in justifying the rule "partly on the ground that husband
and wife are one flesh ..... W. HowswomRTH, supra note 26, at 197. See also Hill v. Proctor,
10 W. Va. 59, 82 (1877), (where the court stated that the "rule is founded partly on the identity
"of their legal rights and interests, and partly on principles of public policy.")
74. J. WiomoRE, supra note 52, § 601, at 857.
75. Id.
76. For a listing of early state cases, see C. CHAmBmu.AYNE, supra note 52, § 3655, at
5211-12.
77. C. McCoRMIcK, supra note 52, § 66, at 161.
78. Id.
79. For statutory provisions, see J.WixoR, supra note 52.
80. In spite of the formulation and application of the privilege by the court in Lady Ivy's
Trial, English courts did not recognize the privilege as a common law creation. Supra note 60,
at 628. In Stapleton v. Crofts, 118 Eng. Rep. 137, 140 (1852), the court stated emphatically
that no such privilege existed at common law; and in Shenton v. Tyler, 1 Ch. 620 (1939) the
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss1/2

18

Cleckley: A Modest Proposal: A Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege for West V

1990]

PSYCHOTHERAPIST-PA TIENT PRIVILEGE

first century and a half after its creation 8' because of the privilege's
existence alongside the marital disqualification and adverse spousal
testimony rules.8 2 Legislative reforms of the marital disqualification
and spousal adverse testimony rules between 1840 and 1870, sig-

nificantly helped the husband-wife communication privilege become
83
a vigorous evidentiary device.
The husband-wife communication privilege has been justified
primarily with the proposition that it promotes family tranquility. 84
Although the privilege shares the public policy idea of promoting
family unity with the rules regarding marital disqualification and
adverse spousal testimony, the privilege is quite distinct from the
rules. 85
In general, the husband-wife communication privilege protects
spouses from having to reveal in court confidential communication
exchanged during their marriage. 86 The rule regarding adverse spousal testimony protects spouses from having to reveal information

court reaffirmed this proposition and credited the privilege's creation to "[s]ect. 3 of the Evidence
Amendment Act, 1853, [which] provides as follows: "No husband shall be compellable to disclose
any communication made to him by his wife during the marriage, and no wife shall be compellable to disclose any communication made to her by her husband during the marriage."
Notwithstanding the strong English disavowal of a common law basis for the privilege, in adopting the privilege in America our courts have insisted upon attributing the privilege to common
law. See e.g., Cook v. Grange, 18 Ohio 526 (1849); Cornell v. Vanartsdalen, 4 Pa. 364 (1864);
Brewer v. Ferguson, 30 Tenn. (11 Hum.) 565 (1851); Robin v. King, 29 Va. (2 Leigh) 140 (1830).
See also C. CHAmmERAYNE, supra note 52, § 3697, at 5291.

81. J.WiomoRE, supra note 51, § 2333, at 644. The next English case in which the privilege
was recogniied was Monroe v. Twistleton, Pea. Add. Cas. 221 (1802).
82. J. WIGROa, supra note 51, § 2333, at 644.
83. Id. at 645. See also McCOaeICK, supra note 52, § 78, at 188- 89.
The reform took place in England and America. However, since the communication privilege
was already recognized in many jurisdictions in the U.S., the impact of legislative reforms of
the disqualification rule and the rule against adverse spousal testimony probably did not have
as prominent an impact on the communication privilege in America, as it did in England-where
courts had said as late as 1852 that no such common law privilege existed.
84. See Note, Testimonial Non-Disclosure, supra note 53, at 218; DePrez, supra note 53,
at 127.
It was stated by the primary advocate for recognition of the privilege in England, that
"[t]he happiness of the married state requires that there should be the most unlimited confidence
between husband and wife, and this confidence the law secures by providing that it shall be kept
forever inviolable." I S. Ganm txA, A TIXrisE oN THm LAW OF EvImENCE 324-25 (14th ed.
1883). See also White v. Perry, 14 W. Va. 66 (1879).
85. Comment, supra note 61, at 308-12; J. WoMoRE, supra note 51, § 2334, at 645-46.
86. J. WioMoRE, supra note 51, § 2335.
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that is adverse to the other spouse, regardless of how the information was learned, e.g., it did not have to be information revealed
in confidence from one spouse to the other.8 7 Further, the marital
disqualification rule prohibited a spouse from testifying on behalf
of the other spouse only when one spouse was a party to the action
or had a direct interest in the outcome of the proceeding. s8
Another prominent difference between the communication privilege and the other two rules is the time frame of termination. 9
The death of a spouse or divorce will terminate the disqualification"
and adverse testimony9' rules. The communication privilege, however, applies in spite of divorce or death of a spouse. 92
The husband-wife communication privilege is acknowledged in
some form in all United States jurisdictions either by common law93
94
or statute.

87. Id. at § 2234.
88. J. WzOMoRE, supra note 52, § 606.
89. "The incompetency of husband or wife to testify for the other, and the privilege of
each spouse against testimony are terminated when the marriage ends by death or divorce." C.
McCoMacK, supra note 52, § 85, at 200. However, the communication privilege does not terminate "after the parties are separated, whether it be by divorce or by ... death ....
" S.
Gramsi.AF, supra note 84, at 325.
90. J. WiGmoRE, supra note 52, § 610.
91. J. WIoMORE, supra note 51, § 2237.
92. Id. at § 2341.
93. See Arnold v. State, 353 So. 2d 524 (Ala. 1977).
94. States with statutory recognition of husband-wife communication privilege: ALASKA R.
Evm. 505 (1987); Am. Ray. STAT. ANN. § 12-2232 (1982); ARK. R. Evm. 504 (1990); CAL.
EviD. CODE ANN. § 971 (Deering 1986); CoLo. REv. STAT. § 13-90-107(a) (Supp. 1989); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-84(a) (West 1985); DEL. R. Evil. 504 (1987); D.C. CODE ANN. § 14-306
(1989); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.504 (West 1979); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-21 (1982); HAW. R. EVID.
505 (1985); IDAHO CODE § 9-203 (Supp. 1989); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 para. 8-801 (Smith-Hurd
1984); IND. CODE ANN. § 34- 1-14-5 (Bums 1990); IowA CODE ANN. § 622.9 (West 1990); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 60-428 (1983); Ky. REv. STAT. AN. § 421.210 (Baldwin Supp. 1988); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13:3734.2 (West Supp. 1990); ME. R. Evm. 504 (1989); MD. CTs. & JUD. PROC.
ANN. § 9- 105 (1989); MASS. GEa. LAws ANN. ch. 233 § 20 (West Supp. 1989); MicH. STAT.
ANN. § 27A.2162 (Callaghan 1986); MwN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02 (West 1988); Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 13-1-5 (1972); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 491.020 (Vernon 1952); MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-1-802 (1988);
NEB. REv. STAT. § 27-504 (1989); Nay. Ray. STAT. § 49.295 (1985); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §
516:27 (1974); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A- 22 (1976); N.M.R. Evo. § 11-505 (1986); N.Y. Civ.
PRAc. L. & R. 4502 (McKinney 1962); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 8-56 & 8-57 (1986); N.D.R. EvrD.
504 (1990); OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 2317.02 (Anderson 1981); OmLA. STAT. ANN. tit.12 § 2504
(West 1980); OR. Ray. STAT. § 40.255 (1989); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5924 (1982); R.I. GEN.
LAws § 9-17-13 (1987); S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-11-30 (Law Co-op., 1989); S.D. CODnED LAWS
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss1/2
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Physician-PatientPrivilege

At common law the physician-patient relationship 95 was not given
the same special treatment in evidentiary law96 as was accorded the
attorney-client and husband-wife relationships. This is to say that
communication between a physician and patient was not accorded
the status of privilege under common law.97 Recognition of the

relationship as privileged first occurred in the United States after
the passage of a statute in New York in 1828.98 Today, most states
have a statutory physician-patient privilege. 99

ANN. § 19-13-13 (1987); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-201 (1980); TEX. R. Evm. 504 (Supp. 1990);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-24-8 (1987); VT. R. EvD. 504 (1983); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-398 (1984);
VASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 5.60.060 (Supp. 1990); W. VA. CODE § 57-3-4 (1966); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 905.05 (1975); Wyo. STAT. § 1-12-101 (1989).
95. For a general discussion see Gellman, Prescribing Privacy-The Uncertain Role of the
Physician in the Protection of Patient Privacy, 62 N.C.L. REV. 255 (1984); Key, The Scope of
the Physician-PatientPrivilege in Criminal Actions: A New Balancing Test, 64 NEB. L. REv.
772 (1985); Note, The Physician-PatientPrivilege, 56 Nw. U.L. REv. 263 (1961); DeWitt, Privileged Communications Between Physician and Patient, 10 W. REs. L. REv. 488 (1959); Note,
Legal Protection of the Confidential Nature of the Physician-PatientRelationship, 52 CoLuM.
L. REV. 383 (1952); Developments in the Law: Privileged Communications, 98 HARv. L. REv.
1450, 1530-55 (1985);8 J. WiMoRE, EVDENCE §§ 2380-2391 (McNaughton rev. 1961); C.
MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE §§ 293-301 (Cleary 1984).
96. The English precedent for the denial of a testimonial privilege for physician-patient
communication was Trial of Elizabeth, 20 How. St. Tr. 355, 373 (1776).
97. Early U.S. courts followed the decision in Trial of Elizabeth and refused to recognize
a physician-patient privilege. See e.g., Sherman v. Sherman, 1 Root 486 (Conn. 1793); Steagald
v. State, 22 Tex. Comm. App. 464, 3 S.W. 771 (1886); Banigan v. Banigan, 26 R.I. 454, 59
A. 313 (1904).
98. N.Y. REv. STAT. 1828, II, 406 (Part III c.VII, Art. 9, § 73). As interpreted by the
courts, "[i]ts purpose is to protect those who are required to consult physicians from the disclosure of secrets imparted to them, to protect the relationship of patient and physician, and
to prevent physicians from disclosing information which might result in humiliation, embarrassment, or disgrace to patients." Steinberg v. New York Life Ins. Co., 263 N.Y. 45, 48, 188
N.E. 152, 153 (1933).
For a discussion of the New York statute, see Note, PrivilegedCommunications:Physician
and Patient, 3 BROOKLYN. L. REv. 104 (1933); Note, Privileged CommunicationsBetween Physician and Patient, 3 N.Y.U. L. REv. 68 (1926).
99. States having a statutory physician-patient privilege: ALAsKA R. Evm. 504 (1989); AiZ.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-2235 (1982); ARK. R. Evm. 503 (1990); CAL. EVID. CODE ANN. § 994
(Deering 1986); CoLo. REv. STAT. § 13-90-107(d) (1987); DEL. R. EvM. 503 (1987); D.C. CODE
ANN. § 14-307 (1989); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-40 (Supp. 1989); HAw.R. EviD. 504 (1985); IDAHo
CODE § 9-203 (Supp. 1989); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 para. 8-802 (Smith-Hurd 1984); IND. CODE
ANN. § 34-1-14-5 (Burns 1990); IowA CODE ANN. § 622.10 (West 1990); KAN. STAT. ANN. §
60-427 (1983); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13:3734 (West Supp. 1990); ME. R. Evw. 503 (1989);
MicH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.2157 (Callaghan 1986); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02 (West 1988); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 13-1-21 (1972); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 491.060 (Vernon Supp. 1990); MONT. CODE
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Various arguments have been made against the need for a physician-patient privilege.10 0 Perhaps the strongest argument is that
the relationship fails to satisfy the first,10' second'0 2 and fourth'03
canons of Dean Wigmore's test for determining whether a relationship merits the status of an evidentiary privilege.' °4 It was said
that, regarding the three canons that the relationship failed to satisfy, (1) rarely will information given to a physician necessitate
confidentiality,105 (2) even though a few instances arise when patient
information would require confidentiality, the information would
be given to a physician in spite of the absence of a privilege, 06
and (3) less harm occurs to the physician-patient relationship than
ANN. § 26-1-85 (1988); NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-504 (1989); NEv. REv. STAT. § 49.215 (1985); N.H.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 329:26 (Supp. 1989); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-22.2 (West 1976); N.Y.
Crv. PRAc. L. & R. 4504 (McKinney 1962); N.C. GN. STAT. § 8-53 (1986); N.D.R. Evm. 503
(1990); Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2317.02 (Anderson 1981); OK.A. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 § 2503
(West 1980); OR. REv. STAT. § 40.235 (1989); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5929 (1982); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 5- 37.3-3 (1987); S.D. CODIID LAWS ANN. § 19-13-7 (1987); TEx. R. Evro. 509 (Supp.
1990); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-24-8 (1987); VT. R. Evro. 503 (1983); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01399 (1984); WASH.REv. CODE ANN. § 5.60.060 (Supp. 1990); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 905.04 (1975);
Wyo. STAT. § 1-12-101 (1989).
States that follow the common law rule and do not recognize a physician-patient privilege:
Home v. Patton, 291 Ala. 701, 287 So. 2d 824 (1973); State v. Devanney, 12 Conn. App. 288,
530 A.2d. 650 (1987); Morrison v. Malmquist, 62 So. 2d 415 (1953); Williams v. Tarter, 286
Ky. 717, 151 S.W.2d 783 (1941); Bratt v. Int'l Business Mach. Corp., 392 Mass. 508, 467 N.E.2d
126 (1984); Trujillo v. Puro, 101 N.M. 408, 683 P.2d 963 (1984); Peagler v. Ati. Coast Line
R.R. Co., 232 S.C. 274, 101 S.E.2d 821 (1958); State v. Fears, 659 S.W.2d 370 (1983); King
v. Kayak Mfg. Corp., 387 S.E.2d 511 (1989).
100. See Curd, Privileged Communications Between the Doctor and His Patient, 44 W.
VA. L.Q. 165 (1938); Morgan, Suggested Remedy for Obstructions to Expert Testimony by Rules
of Evidence, 10 U. Cm. L. REv. 285 (1943); Welch, Another Anomaly: The Patient'sPrivilege,
13 Miss. L.J. 137 (1941).
101. "The communications must originate in a confidence that they will not be disclosed."
J. WicmoRE, supra note 95, § 2285, at 527.
102. "This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties." Id.
103. "The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the communications
must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of litigation." Id.
104. In one scholar's criticism of the privilege the following observation was made: "Undoubtedly, there should be a gentleman's understanding between the physician and the patient
that the physician should not go out and voluntarily discuss most intimate matters affecting his
patient's illness, but where the rights of third parties become involved or the rights of the public
to the extent of litigation or prosecution for violating the laws, the truth should never be suppressed, which in all these instances either aids in defrauding some individual or infringing on
the rights of the public at large." Curd, supra note 100, at 172.
105. J. WioMoRE, supra note 95, § 2380a, at 829.
106. Id.
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it does to the judicial process in providing a privilege for the relationship.10 7 However, Dean Wigmore did concede that his third
canon'08 was satisfied by the physician-patient relationship. 0 9
The primary justification for the physician-patient privilege "is
that the privilege will promote the general health and welfare by
engendering certainty on the part of the patient that the intimate
details he brings to his physician will not be disclosed to the general
public to the patient's humiliation, embarrassment, or disgrace.""10
Generally speaking, the physician-patient privilege can be invoked "to protect only those communications which are necessary
for ... enabling the physician to prescribe remedies or relief.""'
Courts have not been reluctant to admit testimony by physicians
when such testimony involves information unrelated to the curative
needs of patients. 1 2 Moreover, courts have not been hesitant to
admit testimony by physicians when criminal activity surrounds the
3
circumstances of patient treatment."
In keeping with the general rule regarding an evidentiary privilege, the physician-patient privilege remains intact even after the
death of the patient. 1 4 Furthermore, the privilege belongs to the

107. Id. at 830.
108. "The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to be sedulously fostered." Id. at 527.
109. Id. at 830.
110. Note, The Physician-PatientPrivilege, supra note 95, at 266.
111. J. WiomoRE, supra note 95, § 2383, at 842. For example: "Confidential information
privileged. Unless the patient waives the privilege, a person authorized to practice medicine...
shall not be allowed to disclose any information which he acquired in attending a patient in a
professional capacity, and which was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity." N.Y.
PRAc. L. & R. § 4504(a) (1980).
112. See e.g., Cook v. People, 60 Colo. 263, 266-67, 153 P. 214, 215-16 (1915) (physician
allowed to testify that patient had bullet wound and refused to tell physician how wound was
inflicted); Myers v. State, 192 Ind. 592, 137 N.E. 547, 550 (1922) (physician allowed to testify
that he heard patient threaten to kill patient's wife); Soltaniuk v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
133 Pa. Super. 139, 144, 2 A.2d 501, 503 (1938) (privilege extends only to communications, not
to information obtained from observation by physician).
113. See e.g., Maddox v. State, 173 Miss. 799,,805, 163 So. 449, 450 (1935) (in murder
prosecution physician allowed to testify concerning nature of victim's wounds); Cramer v. State,
145 Neb. 88, 96 15 N.W.2d 323, 327-28 (1944).(physician allowed to testify to request to perform
criminal abortion).
114. See, e.g., Bassil v. Ford Motor Co., 278 Mich. 173, 179, 270 N.W. 258, 260'(1936)
(privilege protected consultation decedent had with physician regarding decedent's impotence);
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patient; therefore, the physician may not waive it and disclose pro-

tected information."t 5
D.

Clergy-Penitent Privilege1

6

It is a controversial issue among commentators as to whether
the common law of England acknowledged a clergy-penitent privilege before the Restoration." 7 Notwithstanding this scholarly debate, there is virtually unanimous agreement that after the
Restoration no such privilege was recognized in the common law." 8
Although judicial history or precedent was strongly opposed to a

clergy-penitent privilege, the first recognition of the privilege was
in fact a judicial decision rendered in a New York trial court. 1 9
Davis v. Supreme Lodge, 165 N.Y. 159, 162-71, 58 N.E. 891, 892-95 (1900) (certificate of death
excluded on the basis of privilege); Eder v. Cashin, 281 A.D. 456, 461, 120 N.Y.S.2d, 169 (1953)
(physician's knowledge that decedent had suicidal tendency held to be privileged).
115. J. WioMoRE, supra note 95, § 2386, at 851.
116. This privilege is also referred to as priest-penitent, priest-communicant, and clergycommunicant.
See generally J. WIomoan, EvDmENcE §§ 2394-2396 (J. McNaughton rev. ed. 1961); Hogan,
A Modern Problem on the Privilege of the Confessional, 6 Loy. L. REv. 1 (1951); Kuhlman,
Communicationsto Clergymen-When Are They Privileged, 2 VAL. U.L. Rav. 265 (1968); Reese,
Confidential Communications To The Clergy, 24 Omo ST. L.J. 55 (1963); Yellin, The History
and Current Status of the Clergy-Penitent Privilege, 23 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 95 (1983); Developments in the Law-Privileged Communications, 98 HARv. L. REv. 1450, 1555-62 (1985).
See also Stoyles, The Dilemma of the Constitutionalityof the Priest-PenitentPrivilege-The
Application of the Religion Clauses, 29 U. Prrr. L. REv. 27 (1967).
117. Several commentators use the Reformation as the appropriate historical divider regarding the issue of whether a clergy- penitent privilege existed at some point in time in England.
See Yellin, supra note 116, at 96;- and Developments in the Law, supra note 116, at 1555. Dean
Wigmore used the Restoration as the historical divider. See J.WVimOoRE, supra note 116, § 2394,
at 869.
Notwithstanding this scholarly debate of Reformation and Restoration, there was a judicial
decision handed down before the Restoration which denied that a clergy-penitent privilege existed
at common law. See Yellin, supra note 116, at 96-101 (supporting the position that a clergypenitent privilege existed in common law before the Reformation, but citing Garnett's Case, 2
How. St. Tr. 218 (1606)).
118. See Anonymous, 90 Eng. Rep. 179 (1693); Wilson v. Rastall, 100 Eng. Rep. 1283
(1792).
For an extensive compilation of early English cases denying that a clergy-penitent privilege
existed, see J. WIoMORE, supra note 116, § 2394, at 869-70 n.4.
119. People v. Phillips, N.Y. Ct. Gen. Sess. (1813), abstracted in 1 W. L.J. 109 (1843),
cited in Yellin, supra note 116, at 104-05. In Phillips a priest heard the confession of the defendant
regarding stolen goods the defendant received. The priest was called by the prosecution, but

refused to disclose the defendant's confession. The court held "that a priest should not be
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Several years after the single 120 judicial decision was handed down
recognizing the privilege, New York enacted the first clergy-penitent privilege statute in the United States . 2' Today, the privilege
is recognized in all states,'122 with West Virginia 123 being the last to
recognize it.
The clergy-penitent privilege has been justified on various
grounds. 124 However, the most compelling justification is the fact
that the relationship satisfies all four canons 25 of Dean Wigmore's

compelled to reveal that which he had heard in the administration of the sacrament of Penance."
Id. at 105. But see People v. Smith, 2 City Hall Recorder (Rogers) 77 (N.Y. 1817), cited in
Yellin, supra, at 106. In Smith a minister was called to testify regarding statements the defendant
made in reference to a murder. The court distinguished Phillips by pointing out that the clergyman
in Phillips was a Catholic priest and bound by the rules of the Catholic church. However, the
minister in the case at hand "was Protestant and thus not bound by the seal of the confessional.
It then ordered him to testify." Id., at 106.
120. When the privilege issue was brought before the Massachusetts court, it cited and
followed Smith. Supra note 119. See Commonwealth v. Drake, 15 Mass. 161 (1818).
121. N.Y. REv. STAT. pt. 3, ch.7, § 72 (1828). This was "an explicitly nondenominational
statute protecting clergy- communicant confidences." Developmentsfin the Law, supra note 116,
at 1556.
122. State statutes providing a clergy-penitent privilege: ALA. CODE § 12-21-166 (1985); Aiuz.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-2233 (1982); COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-90-107(c) (1987); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 52-146b (West 1985); D.C. CODE ANN. § 14-309 (1989); FtA. STAT. ANN. § 90.505 (West
1979); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-22 (Supp. 1989); IDAO CODE § 9-203 (Supp. 1989); IL. STAT.
ANN. ch.110, para. 8- 803 (1984); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-1-14-5 (Burns 1990); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 622.10 (West 1990); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-429 (1983); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 421.210 (Michie/
Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1988); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13:3734.1 (West Supp. 1990); MAss. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch.233 § 20A (West Supp. 1989); MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.2156 (Callaghan 1986);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02 (West 1988); Miss. CODE ANN. § 13-1-22 (Supp. 1990); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 491.060 (Vernon Supp. 1990); MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-1-804 (1988); NEa. REV. STAT.
§ 27-506 (1989); NEv. REv. STAT. § 49.255 (1985); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 516:35 (Supp. 1989);
N.J. STAT. Am. § 2A:84A- 23 (West 1976); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53.2 (1986); Onio Rev. CODE
ANN. § 2317.02 (Anderson 1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN.tit. 12 § 2505 (West 1980); OR. REv. STAT.
§ 40.260 (1989); PA. STAT. ANN.tit. 42 § 5943 (Purdon 1982); R.I. GN. LAws § 9-17-23 (1987);
S.C. CODE ANN. § A-11-90 (Law. Co-op. 1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1- 206 (1980); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 78-24-8 (1987); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-400 (1984); WAsH. Rev. CODE ANN. §
5.60.060 (Supp. 1990); W. VA. CODE § 57-3-9 (Supp. 1990); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 905.06 (1975);
CODE
Wyo. STAT. § 1-12-101 (1989); ALASKA R. EvuD. 506; ARK. R. EvI. 505; CAL. Ev.
ANN. § 1030-34 (West 1986); DEL. R. EviD. 505; HAw. R. Evm. 506; ME. R. Evir. 505; MD.
CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-111 (1989); N.M. R. EviD. § 11-506; N.Y. CIrv. PRAC. L.
& R. 4505; N.D. R. EviD. 505; TEx. R. Evm. 505; VT. R. EvD. 505.
123. The privilege went into effect June, 1990.
124. For a summary of the rationales, see Developments in the Law, supra note 116, at
1560-62.
125. See, supra notes 101-03 and 108.
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test for determining whether a relationship merits evidentiary privileges.126
Although statutes vary in the wording of the privilege,1 27 generally speaking the privilege attaches to communications between
a clergyperson in his or her professional capacity'28 and the defendant according to the canons of the clergyperson's denomination. 2 9 Statutes in many jurisdictions differ on who is allowed to
invoke the privilege. 30 A few state statutes give the privilege to the
126. J. WiomoRE, supra note 116, § 2396, at 878.
For a discussion opposed to the privilege in statutory form see Note, Striking Down the
Clergyman-CommunicantPrivilegeStatutes-Let Free Exercise Govern, 62 IND. L.J. 397 (1987).
127. See, e.g., S.C. CODE on the Priest-penitent privilege. In any legal or quasi-legal trial,
hearing or proceeding before any county commission or committee no regular or duly ordained
minister, priest or rabbi shall be required, in giving testimony, to disclose any confidential communication properly entrusted to him in his professional capacity and necessary and proper to
enable him to discharge the functions of his office according to the usual course of practice or
discipline of his church or riligious body. This prohibition shall not apply to cases where the
party in whose favor it is made waives the rights conferred. S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-11-90 (Law
Co-op. 1985).
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 905 covers communications to clergymen.
(1) Definitions. As used in this section:
(a) A "clergyman" is a minister, priest, rabbi, or other similar functionary of a
religious organization, or an individual reasonably believed so to be by the person
consulting him.
(b) A communication is "confidential" if made privately and not intended for
further disclosure except to other persons present in furtherance of the purpose of
the communication.
(2) General rule of privilege. A person has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to
prevent another from disclosing a confidential communication by the person to a
clergyman in his professional character as a spiritual adviser.
(3) Who may claim the privilege. The privilege may be claimed by the person, by
his guardian or conservator, or by his personal representative if he is deceased. The
clergyman may claim the privilege on behalf of the person. His authority so to do
is presumed in the absence of evidence to the contrary.
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 905 (1975).

128. See, e.g., Cottrili v. State, 365 So. 2d 450 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (at a marriage
counseling session defendant admitted to a minister his guilt in sexual assault charge, and it was
held to be reversible error in admitting testimony of minister regarding confession by defendant).
But see State v. Vest, 317 N.C. 219, 345 S.E.2d 186 (1986) (where a minister was allowed to
testify regarding defendant's confession of guilt in rape prosecution, because defendant made
confession in presence of minister's wife).
129. See, e.g., Ball v. State, 275 Ind. 617, 419 N.E.2d 137 (1981) (where defendant confessed
to a pastor that he killed three men, and court allowed pastor to testify because confession was
not one of the tenets of the pastor's church). But see Kohloff v. Bronx Savings Bank, 233
N.Y.S.2d 849, 37 Misc.2d 27 (1962) (where it was held that even though a penitent is not a
member of the church in which the penitent makes a confession, the privilege is still applicable).
130. Yellin, supra note 116, at 137-38.
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clergy rather than the penitent. 31 Other statutes grant the privilege
to the clergy and penitent, 32 a few other statutes provide that the
33
privilege belongs to the penitent alone.
Moreover, statutes have differed in the definition given 34 to the
term "clergy".'3 5 The lack of precision in some definitions of the
36
term has caused inconsistency in judicial opinions.1
E.

Privileged Communications in Federal Courts

Privilege law in particular, and evidentiary law in general, have
a remarkable history of inconsistency and confusion prior to congressional enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence (F.R.E.) in
1975.1 37 Of course, the inconsistency and confusion herein alluded
to was based upon the vexing question of whether to apply federal
or state evidence law to cases sitting in federal courts. 38 In attempting to trace the web-like path that led to the F.R.E., it is
perhaps best to examine federal evidence law in three distinct

131. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-400 (1984); MD. CTs. & JUD. PROC. ANN. § 9-111

(1989).
132. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-21-166 (1985); CAL. Evm. CODE ANN. §§ 1030-34.
133. See, e.g., Nay. Rnv. STAT. § 49.255 (1985); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 905.06 (1975).
134. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.505 (West 1979) (clergy of any organization or de-

nomination usually referred to as a church); D.C. CODE ANN. § 14-309 (1989) (clergy of a religion
authorized to perform a marriage ceremony); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 491.060 (other person serving
in a similar capacity to that of a clergyperson); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-429 (1983) (regular minister
of religion).
135.. For a complete listing of the various definitions used, see Yelin, supra note 116, at
114-21.
136. See Reutkemeier v. Nolte, 179 Iowa 342, 161 N.W. 290 (1917) (where it was held that
elders in a Presbyterian church were included in a statute which gave the privilege to ministers
of the gospel). But see Knight v. Lee, 80 Ind. 201 (1881) (where it was held that an elder and
deacon who had acted on behalf of the pastor were not covered by the privilege statute).
137. See generally Leach, State Law of Evidence in the FederalCourts, 43 HAv. L. REv.
554 (1929). See also 1 WIGMoRE, Evidence §§ 6-6.2 (Tillers rev. 1983); 2 LOUISELL AND MUELLER,
FederalEvidence §§ 200-249 (1985). Comment, Evidence Rules in the FederalCourts-A Time
for a Change, 38 TEx. L. REv. 451 (1960); Louisell, Confidentiality, Conformity and ConfusionPrivileges in Federal Court Today, 31 Tux.ANE L. Rav. 101 (1956); Pugh, Rule 43(a) and the
Communication Privileged Under State Law-An Analysis of Confusion, 7 VAD. L. REv. 556
(1954).
138. Developments in the Law-PrivilegedCommunications, 98 HARv. L. REv. 1450, 1463

(1985).
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phases: 13 9 (1) Rules of Decision Act,1 40 Swift v. Tyson 14 1 and United
States v. Reid;142 (2) Wolfle v. United States 43 and Erie Railroad
Co. v. Tompkins; 44 and (3) Federal Rules of Procedure.

45

The admissibility of evidence in federal question and diversity
cases was outlined in the Rules of Decision Act. 46 Under this Act,
federal courts were mandated to apply the evidence law of the state

in which they sat. 147 However, in Swift v. Tyson 148 it was held that
federal courts sitting in diversity cases had to apply state statutory
law, but not state decisional law. 49 In United States v. Reid'50 the
Court addressed the issue of evidentiary law in federal criminal
cases. It was determined in Reid that the admissibility of evidence
in federal criminal cases should be based upon the law of the forum
state as it existed in 1789."'
The decision in Reid was ultimately rejected by the Court's
holding in Wolfie v. United States. 52 In Wolfle it was held that
the admissibility of evidence "in criminal trials in the federal courts
139. See Krattenmaker, Interpersonal Testimonial Privileges under the Federal Rules of
Evidence-A Suggested Approach, 64 GEo. L.J. 613, 615 (1976).
140. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch.20, § 34, 1 Stat. 92 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §
1652 (1982)).
141. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
142. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 361 (1851).
143. 291 U.S. 7 (1934).
144. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
145. FED. R. Civ. P. 43(a); FED. R. CRpm. P. 26.
146. The Act provided: The laws of the several states, except where the Constitution, treaties
of the United States or acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules
of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where they apply. Judiciary
Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 92 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1982)).
Federal courts were granted general jurisdiction of civil actions based on federal questions
in 1875. See Judiciary Act of 1875, ch.137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1331
(1970).
147. See, e.g., Lucas v. Brooks, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 436 (1873) (husband-wife 'statute);
Southwest Metals Co. v. Gomez, 4 F.2d 215 (9th Cir. 1925) (physician-patient statute); In re
Jefferson, 96 F. 826 (D.C. Wash. 1899) (husband-wife statute).
148. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
149. Id. at 18-19.
150. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 361 (1851).
151. Id. at 389-90. The impact of this ruling was that of locking out state evidentiary statutes
in federal criminal cases, which were enacted after 1789 by any of the original thirteen states.
See, e.g., United States v. Perkins, 221 F. 109 (E.D. S.C. 1915).
152. 291 U.S. 7 (1934) (where the court held admissible confidential communication between
spouses which was written by a stenographer, in spite of claim of spousal privilege).
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are not necessarily restricted to those local rules in force at the
time of the admission into the Union of the particular state where
the trial takes place, but are governed by common law principles
as interpreted and applied by the federal courts in the light of
153
reason and experience."
Several years after Wolfle the Court, by implication, addressed
the issue of evidentiary law in diversity cases in Erie Railroad Co.
v. Tompkins. 5 4 The Court had to overrule its decision in Swift v.
Tyson 155 in order to hold that federal courts had to apply state
legislative and decisional substantive law in diversity cases. 56 One
commentator noted that "Federal courts exercising diversity jurisdiction always had followed state evidence law in principle, but
...

the Court in Erie clarified that both statutory and decisional

15 7
evidence law of the state applied in diversity cases." 1

Acting under congressional authorization, 158 the Supreme Court

promulgated the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (F.R.C.P.) in
161
1939.159 Until enactment of Rule 501160 of the F.R.E., Rule 43(a)
of the F.R.C.P. governed privilege questions in virtually all federal
civil cases. 162 This is not to suggest that federal courts never differed
153. Id.at 12.
154. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
155. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
156. 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
157. Krattenmaker, supra note 139, at 624.
158. Act of June 19, 1934, ch.651, §§ 1-2, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2072
(1970)).
159. 308 U.S. 645 (1939).
160. See infra note 187.
161. The rule provided:
In all trials the testimony of witnesses shall be taken orally in open court, unless
otherwise provided by these rules. All evidence shall be admitted which is admissible
under the statutes of the United States, or under the rules of evidence heretofore applied
in the courts of the United States on the hearing of suits in equity, or under the rules
of evidence applied in the courts of general jurisdiction of the state in which the United
States court is held. In any case, the statute or rule which favors the reception of the
evidence governs and the evidence shall be presented according to the most convenient
method prescribed in any of the statutes or rules to which reference is herein made.
The competency of a witness to testify shall be determined in like manner.
FED. R. Civ. P. 43(a).

162. Krattenmaker, supra note 139, at 625. See also Note, Federal Courts: Evidence State
PrivilegeRules Applicable In Diversity Actions: FederalRule of Civil Procedure 43(a), 44 CA in.
L. REv. 949 (1956).
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on their interpretation of Rule 43(a) 163 nor were privilege questions
in federal civil matters always resolved in harmony with Rule
43(a). 1" However, in spite of varying interpretations of Rule 43(a),
"by the mid-1960s all respectable authority pointed to one conclusion: in diversity cases, claims of testimonial privilege were gov1 65
erned by state law.'
Privilege issues in federal criminal cases were governed by Rule
26166 of the F.R.C.P1 67 from 1946 to the enactment of Rule 501
of F.R.E. Rule 26 did not bring about the uniformity and certainty
its drafters expected.1 68 Federal courts varied in their interpretation
70
of the rule, 69 which invariably led to inconsistent holdings.
In light of the persistent confusion and inconsistency in federal
evidentiary rulings, the Supreme Court, pursuant to the Rules Enabling Acts,171 promulgated the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence
(Proposed Rules) in 1972.172 In Article V of the Proposed Rules

163. See, e.g., Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. McAdoo, 106 F.2d 618, 621 (8th Cir. 1939) (where
the rule was interpreted as saying that if evidence was admissible under federal law, state law
did not have to be followed); Anderson v. Benson, 117 F. Supp. 765, 772 (D. Neb. 1953) (where
the rule was interpreted as requiring judges to defer only to state statutory privileges).
164. A few courts based their decision upon Erie, 304 U.S. at 64. See, e.g., Palmer v.
Fisher, 228 F.2d 603 (7th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 965 (1956); Miller v. Pacific Mut.
Life Ins. Co., 116 F. Supp. 365 (W.D. Mich. 1953).
165. Krattenmaker, supra note 139, at 627.
166. The rule provided:
In all trials the testimony of witnesses shall be taken orally in open court, unless
otherwise provided by ariact of Congress or by these rules. The admissibility of evidence and the competency and privileges of witnesses shall be governed, except when
an act of Congress or these rules otherwise provide, by principles of the common law
as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason
and experience.
FED. R. Can. P. 26.
167. 327 U.S. 821 (1945).
168. DamPrE. ars mN TH LAw, supra note 138, at 1464.
169. A few courts interpreted the rule to mean that the privilege law of the forum state
governed. See, e.g., In re Verplank, 329 F. Supp. 433 (D.C. Cal. 1971) (where the court followed
the spirit of Rule 26 and recognized a clergy-communicant privilege in federal criminal matters).
170. See, e.g., United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 922 (2d Cir. 1961) (where communication with an accountant who was employed by the defendant's attorney was held privileged);
But see, Himmelfarb v. United States, 175 F.2d 924 (9th Cir. 1949) (where communication with
an accountant who was employed by the defendant's attorney was held not privileged).
171. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3402, 3771, 3772 (1983); 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072, 2075 (1983).
172. 56 F.R.D. 183 (1972). Tentative drafts were published in 46 F.R.D. 161 (1969) and
51 F.R.D. 315 (1971).
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recognition was given to nine privileges. 73 These privileges include:
statute reports , 74 attorney-client, 75 psychotherapist-patient, 76 husvote, 79 trade
band-wife,177 communications to clergymen, 78 political
2
8
1
8
secrets, 80 state secrets' ' and informant's identity.
Primarily because of Article V of the Proposed Rules, Congress
took steps to prevent implementation of the Proposed Rules. 8 3 The
debate 84 taken up by opponents of Article V was mounted on three
fronts:
[F]irst, that the Erie doctrine rendered the application of federal privilege law
in diversity cases unconstitutional (or at least unwise); second, that the promulgation of privilege rules was beyond the scope of the Supreme Court's authird, that the rules as drafted were
thority under the Rules Enabling Acts; and,
'
incomplete, inconsistent, and incoherent. ss

Ultimately Congress enacted its own version of the Federal Rules
of Evidence 8 6 which did not include Article V of the Proposed
Rules.

For a discussion see Weinstein, The Uniformity-Conformity Dilemma Facing Draftsmen of
FederalRules of Evidence, 69 CoLum. L. RPv. 353 (1969); Schwartz, The ProposedFederalRules

of Evidence: An Introduction and Critique, 38 U. CN. L. REv. 449 (1969).
173. Actually thirteen rules were provided in Article V, but four of the rules did not create
privileges per se. See, F. R. Evm. 511-13 and 501; 56 F.R.D. 230-61 (1972).
174. Id. at 234 (Rule 502).
175. Id. at 235 (Rule 503).
176. Id. at 240 (Rule 504).
177. rd. at 244 (Rule 505).
178. Id. at 247 (Rule 506).
179. Id. at 249 (Rule 507).
180. Id. at 250 (Rule 508).
181. Id. at 251 (Rule 509).
182. Id. at 255 (Rule 510).
183. Rothstein, Tm PRoPosED AmENDENTs TO THE FEDmuL RuLEs oF EVImENCE, 62 GEO.
L.J. 125 (1973).
A bill was 'passed requiring affirmative congressional approval of the Proposed Rules before
they could take effect. See Act of March 30, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-12, 87 Stat. 9 (1973).
For further discussion see Kaminsky, STATE EvEDENTARY PRIVIEGEs IN FEn~mx Cvi
LmOATION, 43 FoRDaaA L. REv. 923 (1975).
184. See, HearingsBefore the Senate Comm. on the Judiciaryon FederalRules of Evidence,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974); HearingsBefore the Special Subcomm. on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws of the House Comm. on the Judiciaryon Proposed Rules of Evidence, 93d Cong.,
Ist Sess. (1973).
185. Developments in the Law, supra note 138, at 1466.
186. Act of January 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (codified as amefided at
28 U.S.C. app. (1982)).
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Congress adopted a general privilege rule, Rule 501,87 in place
of Article V. Under Rule 501, state privilege law generally applies
in diversity cases, 8 8 but federal question cases are settled under
federal law. 89
III.

PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS IN WEST VIRGINIA'

90

This discussion is not intended to encompass all evidentiary
privileges that may be available under statutory or decisional law
in West Virginia. The purpose here is simply to provide a historical
overview of the state's position on the privileges thus far discussed.

187. FED. R. EvID. 501 provides:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or provided by
Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory
authority, the privilege of a witness, person, government, state, or political subdivision
thereof shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience.
However, in civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or
defense as to which state law supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness,
person, government, state or political subdivision thereof shall be determined in accordance with state law.
FED. R. EvID. 501.

188. See, e.g., Roberts v. Carrier Corp., 107 F.R.D. 678 (N.D. Ind. 1985) (attorney-client);
Sabree v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of America, 126 F.R.D. 422 (D. Mass. 1989)
(psychotherapist-patient); Eckmann v. Bd. of Educ. of Hawthorn Sch. Dist., 106 F.R.D. 70
(E.D. Mo. 1985) (priest-penitent); Buffington v. Gillette Co., 101 F.R.D. 400 (W.D. Okl. 1980)
(physician-patient).
189. See, e.g., Bulow by Auersperg v. Bulow, 811 F.2d 136 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied
481 U.S. 1015, (1987) (journalist privilege). In re Zuniga, 714 F.2d 632 (6th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 983, (1983) (psychotherapist-patient); United States v. Friedman, 636 F.Supp.
462 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (psychotherapist-patient); Urseth v. City of Dayton, 110 F.R.D. 245 (S.D.
Ohio 1986) (executive privilege); Research Institute for Medicine and Chemistry, Inc. v. Wisconsin
Alumni Research Found., 107 F.R.D. 672 (W.D. Wis: 1987) (attorney-client).
190. This section is not concerned with the development of evidentiary privileges in justice
of the peace courts (now magistrate courts). It will be mentioned here, however, that the Acts
of 1863 created an attorney-client, husband-wife, and clergy-penitent privilege in justice of the
peace courts. See Acts of 1863, c.122 § 157, (codified as amended at W. VA. CODE c.50 § 108
(1868)) (physician/surgeon-patient added at W. VA. CODE § 50-6-10 (1976)). This statute was
repealed by the Acts of 1976, c.33. A general privilege law now exists for the formerly named
justice of the peace courts. See W. VA. CODE § 50-5-5 (1986).
For a general discussion of the changes made in justice of the peace courts, see Purbaugh
and Burnside, JudicialReform in West Virginia: The Magistrate Court System, 79 W. VA. L.
Rv. 304 (1977).
Under West Virginia Rules of Evidence (W.V.R.E.) a general privilege rule is provided for
all state courts. Rule 501 states: "The privilege of a witness, person, government, state, or
political subdivision thereof shall be governed by the principles of the common law except as
modified by the Constitution of the United States or West Virginia, statute or court rule."
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss1/2
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A.

191
Attorney-Client Privilege

The common law attorney-client privilege has long been rec-

ognized by the West Virginia Supreme Court. 192 In State v.
Douglass'93 the court indicated that the attorney-client privilege was
justified on the "grounds of public policy, because greater mischiefs would probably result from requiring or permitting... [dis' 94
closures], than from wholly rejecting them.'
The court has determined that in order for the privilege to be

applicable, three elements must be established. 195 First, the relation
of lawyer and client must be contemplated by both parties or ac-

tually exist. 196 Second, the client must be seeking advice from the
lawyer in his or her capacity as a legal adviser. 197 Third, the lawyer
and client must intend for their communication to be confidential. 198
Aside from having to make determinations on the three essential
elements of the privilege, the court has also had opportunities to

decide other matters related to the privilege. 199 The court has made
it clear that the identity of a client or former client cannot be
withheld from the court, 2°° though the communication may be sub-

ject to the privilege. It has also been determined by the court that
the fee arrangement between an attorney and client is subject to

191. For a more detailed treatment see Note, The Attorney-ClientPrivilege in West Virginia,
54 W. VA. L. REv. 297 (1952).
192. See State v. Douglass, 20 W. Va. 770 (1882) (where defendant's conversation informing
his attorney of the whereabouts of a gun used in defendant's murder trial was held to be privileged
communication).

193. -1d.
194. Id. at 780.
195. See State v. Burton, 163 W. Va. 40, 254 S.E.2d 129 (1979).
196. See Woodrum v. Price, 104 W. Va. 382, 140 S.E. 346 (1927) (where the court held
that no attorney-client relationship existed or was contemplated). But see Donohoe v. Collett,
87 W. Va. 383, 105 S.E. 265 (1920) (where the court held that an attorney-client relationship
existed even though the client did not pay for the advice given); Hodge v. Garten, 116 W. Va.
564, 182 S.E. 582 (1935) (holding same).
197. See Woodrum, supra note 196.
198. See Burton, supra note 195 (where communication between attorney and client was
not confidential because it took place in the presence of others).
199. See 20 M.J., Witnesses, § 28.
200. See State v. Fisher, 126 W. Va. 117, 27 S.E.2d 581 (1943).
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disclosure. 20 1 It has also been held that, under certain circumstances, if an attorney discloses confidential information out of
court and in the presence of the client, the privilege may still protect
the information in court. 20 2 Further, where a client consults two
independent attorneys regarding the same potential litigation, the
court has ruled that the privilege attaches to both attorneys.2 3
However, where two clients consult the same attorney in drawing
up a contract, the privilege is not applicable in subsequent litigation
24
involving the two clients as adversaries. 0
B.

Husband-Wife Privilege

The common law prohibition of a spouse testifying for 205 or
against 2 6 the other spouse was given statutory recognition in the
state under the Code of 1868.207 The court's first opportunity to
interpret this statute came in Hill v. Proctor.20 1 In Hill the court
held that the statute prohibited the use of a spouse's deposition
on behalf of the other spouse. 209 Several other cases were decided
under the statute210 before it was amended by the Acts of 1882.211

201. See Moats v. Rymer, 18 W. Va. 642 (1881).
202. See State v. Dickey, 46 W. Va. 319, 33 S.E. 231 (1899) (where the attorney disclosed
information about the client to a prosecutor, while the client was present, but the court felt the
client was not in a position to silence the attorney).
203. See Thomas v. Jones, 105 W. Va. 46, 53, 141 S.E. 434, 437 (1928).
204. See Kirchner v. Smith, 61 W. Va. 434, 447, 58 S.E. 614, 619 (1907).
205. See sources cited supra note 52.
206. See sources cited supra note 51.
207. The Code provided: "A husband shall not be examined for or against his wife, nor
a wife for or against her husband, except in an action or suit between husband and wife." W.
VA. CODE ch. 130 § 23(5) (1868).
208. 10 W. Va. 59 (1877) (current version at W. VA. CODE §§ 57-3-2, -3).
209. Id. at 82-84.
210. See e.g., Anderson v. Snyder, 21 W. Va. 633 (1883); Zane v. Fink, 18 W. Va. 693
(1881); Campbell Adm'r, White and Janney v. Campbell's Adm'r, 14 W. Va. 123, 149 (1878);
White v. Perry, 14 W. Va. 66 (1878); Rose v. Brown, 1 W. Va. 122 (1877).
211. The Acts abolished disqualification, i.e., making spouses competent to testify for or
against each other in civil matters. See The Acts of 1882, ch. 160 § 22 p.544 (codified as amended
at W. VA. CODE § 57-3-2 (1966)).
The Acts also created an adverse spousal testimony privilege in criminal matters. Id. at ch.
151 § 19 p.484 (codified as amended at W. VA. CODE § 57-3-3 (1966)).
Finally, the Acts created a spousal confidential communication privilege. Id. ch. 160 § 22
p.544 (codified as amended at W. VA. CODE § 57-3-4 (1966)).
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Under the Acts of 1882212 a spouse was permitted to testify for
or against the other spouse in civil proceedings. 2 3 However, confidential communications made during the marriage were privi-

leged.21 4 Moreover, the Acts created an adverse spousal testimonial
21 5
privilege in criminal proceedings.

Although the current statutory formulations of the rules216 en-

compass more than provided in the Acts of 1882,217 the central
218
legal concepts of the Acts remain.

C.

Physician-PatientPrivilege219
The physician-patient privilege is not recognized in the state by

statute22 or decisional law. 221 The issue of a physician-patient priv212. For a judicial discussion of the statutory changes see Kilgore's Adm'r v. Hanley, 27
W. Va. 451 (1886).
213. See First Bank of Jefferson v. Harris, 56 W. Va. 345, 49 S.E. 252 (1904).
214. See Kilgore's Adm'r v. Hanley, 27 W. Va. 451 (1886).
215. See State v. Woodrow, 58 W. Va. 527, 52 S.E. 545 (1905).
216. "Husband and wife shall be competent witnesses to testify for or against each other
in all cases, civil and criminal, except as otherwise provided." W. VA. CODE § 57-3-2 (1986).
In criminal cases husband and wife shall be allowed, and, subject to the rules of
evidence governing other witnesses, may be compelled to testify in behalf of each other,
but neither shall be compelled, nor, without the consent of the other, allowed to be
called as a witness against the other except in the case of a prosecution for an offense
committed by one against the other, or against the child, father, mother, sister or
brother of either of them.
W. VA. CODE § 57-3-3 (1986).
Neither husband nor wife shall, without the consent of the other, be examined in any
case as to any confidential communication made by one to the other while married,
nor shall either be permitted, without such consent, to reveal in testimony after the
marriage relation ceases any such communication made while the marriage existed.
W. VA. CODE § 57-3-4 (1986).
217. For example, the ability of spouses to testify for or against each other under the Acts
of 1882 was limited to civil proceedings. However, this provision has been extended to criminal
proceedings in the current statute. Further, the current communication privilege statute permits
the privilege to remain even after the marriage ceases; whereas the Acts of 1882 had no such
provision.
218. See, e.g., Ohlinger v. Roush, 119 W. Va. 272, 193 S.E. 328 (1937) (competency of
spouses to testify); State v. Evans, 310 S.E.2d 877 (W. Va. 1982) (adverse spousal testimony);
State v. Robinson, 376 S.E.2d 606 (W. Va. 1988) (spousal communication privilege).
219. For a discussion of the privilege see Note, The Physician- Patient Privilege, 58 W.
VA. L. R-v. 76 (1955). For criticism of the privilege see Curd, PrivilegedCommunications Between The Doctor And His Patient-An Anomaly Of The Law, 44 W. Va. L.Q. 165 (1938).
220. The relationship was recognized as privileged by statute in justice of the peace courts,
from 1863 to 1976, when the provision was repealed. See supra note 190.
221. See King v. Kayak Mfg. Corp., 387 S.E.2d 511, 522 (W. Va. 1989).
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ilege was first addressed by the court in Mohr v. Mohr.222 In Mohr
the court had an opportunity to construe W. VA. CODE 50-6-10
(now repealed). 223 The statute provided for a physician-patient privilege in justice of the peace courts. 224 The court did not deem it
advisable to extend the provision to courts of record.225 As a consequence, the Mohr decision became precedent for the proposition
that no physician-patient privilege is recognized in courts of record.

D.

226

Clergy-Penitent Privilege

The court has never directly or indirectly addressed the relationship of the clergy and penitent. The relationship was accorded
a statutory privilege in the justice of the peace courts until the
statute was repealed in, 1976. 227 In spite of the lack of case law on
the relationship, the state legislature enacted a clergy-penitent privilege on March 10, 1990.22 The statute provides as follows:
No priest, nun, rabbi or member of the clergy authorized to celebrate the
rites of marriage in this state pursuant to the provisions of article one, chapter
forty-eight of this code shall be compelled to testify in any criminal or grand
jury proceedings or in any domestic relations action in any court of this state:
(1) With respect to any confession or communication, made to such person,
in his or her professional capacity in the course of discipline enjoined by the
church or other religious body to which he or she belongs, without the consent
of the person making such confession or communication; or
(2) With respect to any communication made to such person, in his or her
professional capacity, by either spouse, in connection with any effort to reconcile estranged spouses, without the consent of the spouse making the communication. This subsection is in addition to the protection and privilege afforded
pursuant to section ten-a, article two, chapter forty-eight of this code. 22'9

222. 119 W. Va. 253, 193 S.E. 121 (1937).
223. See sources cited supra note 190.
224. The statute is worded in terms of incompetency, but the term privilege is applicable.
See Purbaugh & Burnside, supra note 190, at 325 n. 154.
225. Mohr v. Mohr, 119 W. Va. 253, 256, 193 S.E. 121, 122 (1937).
226. See State v. Cheshire, 313 S.E.2d 61 (W. Va. 1984); State v. Simmons, 309 S.E.2d
89 (W. Va. 1983).
227. See sources cited supra note 190.
228. The statute took effect ninety days after passage. W. VA. CODE § 57-3-9 (Supp. 1990).
229. Id. The state also has a statute which provides for privileged communications between
clergy and spouses in divorce proceedings. See W. VA. CODE § 48-2-10a (1986).
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IV.

PSYCHOTHERAPIST-PATIENT PRIVILEGE

230
DEVELOPMENT OF PSYCHOTHERAPIST-PATIENT PRIVILEGE

In a very real sense the psychotherapist-patient privilege owes
its existence to the New York legislature's enactment of the first
statutory physician-patient privilege in the United States. 231 Judicial
recognition of the psychotherapist-patient privilege resulted from
the application of loosely defined physician-patient privilege statutes.232 Pure psychotherapist-patient privilege statutes 233 did not
begin to surface until 1948.234 In spite of the rather short statutory
history of the privilege, it is firmly implanted in the codes of every
state, 235 except West Virginia.
Around the period that pure psychotherapist-patient privilege
statutes began to appear, the privilege was accorded its first com-

mon law recognition in Binder v. Ruvell.236 In taking the unprecedented step toward recognizing the privilege by decisional law, the

court analyzed the privilege under Dean Wigmore's test for determining whether to accord a relationship evidentiary privilege and
concluded that "the social significance of [a psychotherapist-pa-

tient privilege] is probably even greater than that which comes from
the protection of the communications between lawyer and client.,

237

230. For the purpose of this article psychotherapist refers to psychiatrist and psychologist.
231. See sources cited supra note 198.
232. See, e.g., Taylor v. United States, 222 F.2d 398, (D.C. Cir. 1955); State v. Evans,
104 Ariz. 434, 454 P.2d 976 (1969); In re Fline, 100 Cal. 391, 34 P. 863 (1893); Linscott v.
Hughbanks, 140 Kan. 353, 37 P.2d 26 (1934); Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Board of
Trustees, 178 Mich. 193, 144 N.W. 538 (1913); People v. Wasker, 353 Mich. 447, 91 N.W.2d
866 (1958); State v. Hunt, 25 N.J. 514, 138 A.2d 1 (1958); Casson v. Schoenfeld, 166 Wis. 401,
166 N.W. 23 (1918); Jaffe v. New York, 196 Misc. 710 (1949), 94 N.Y.S.2d 60.
233. That is, psychotherapist-patient privilege statutes which were independent from physician-patient statutes.
234. Kentucky appears to have enacted the first psychologist-patient privilege statute. See
Act approved March 25, 1948, ch. 169 § 11, 1948 Ky. Acts. 385 (codified at 1953 Ky. Rev.
Stat. § 319.110, repealed by 1964 Ky. Acts. ch. 154 § 18; 1988 Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 319.111).
Georgia appears to have enacted the first psychiatrist-patient privilege statute. See 1959.Ga.
Laws 190 (codified at GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-21 (1982)).
235. See sources cited supra note 14.
236. Civil Docket 52C2535, Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, June 24, 1952, reprinted
in Plunkett, Psychiatric Communications Privileged, 150 J. A.M.A. 1241 (1952).
237. Plunkett, supra note 236, at 1242.
The court went on to say, in part:
Psychiatry is a relatively new science. Its function is to study the operation of the
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Although Dean Wigmore did not provide an analysis of the
psychotherapist-patient relationship, 238 commentators have acknowledged that the relationship satisfies the four canons 239 of his
test.2 ° Further, it has been argued that "[rleason indicates that the
absence of a privilege would make it doubtful whether either psychotherapists or their patients could communicate effectively if it
were thought that what they said could be disclosed compulsorily
in a court of law." 2' The unquestioned need for confidentiality in
psychotherapy has been the central rationale for legislative action
242
in bringing forth psychotherapist-patient privilege statutes.

mind and to apply methods of healing where the mind is disturbed ....
It is conceivable that courts in a situation such as is presented here today would
say, true, you are engaged in the profession of healing the mentally disturbed, the
maladjusted members of our society. We know that you cannot do it successfully
without probing into the inner recesses of the mind. We know that you cannot do it
without obtaining the confidence of your patient and getting the information from
him. Nevertheless, it is our job to get all information we can in order to correctly
dispose of a case. Therefore, we are going to compel you to disclose those matters
which came to you as a result of your confidential relationship and thereby run the
risk of such a disservice to society.... My understanding of the law is otherwise. I
am persuaded that the courts will guard the secrets which come to the psychiatrist and
will not permit him to disclose them ....
The fact that there is no precedent for it is really of no moment. There cannot be a
precedent until the question is presented to the courts for decision. And if evidence
of changing conditions or changing knowledge is presented to the court, the court must
in some way seek to ascertain what the general community interest demands and what
the customs and practices of the people in that respect are and from that pronounce
its understanding of the public policy. Accordingly, I shall hold that all confidential
communication between [the patient and psychiatrist] are privileged and may not be
inquired into.
Id. (The case was not appealed and the trial court decision stood.)
238. No doubt this is due to the fact that psychotherapy was in its infancy stage during
the period that Dean Wigm'ore wrote.
239. See sources cited supra notes 101-03 and 108.
240. See Foster, An Overview of Confidentiality and Privilege, 4 J. PsYCmATRY & L. 393
(1976); Knapp, VandeCreek & Zirkel, Privileged Communicationsfor Psychotherapistsin Pennsylvania-A Time for Statutory Reform, 60 T mp. L.Q. 267 (1987); Slovenko, Psychiatry and a
Second Look at the Medical Privilege, 6 WAYNE L. Ray. 175 (1960); Comment, The Psychotherapist-PatientPrivilege In Texas, 18 Hous. L. Rv. 136 (1980); Note, Confidential Communications to a Psychotherapist:A New Testimonial Privilege, 47 Nw. U.L. hav. 384 (1952);
Developments in the Law-Privileged Communications, 98 HAiv. L. REv. 1450, 1539-55 (1985).
241. Allred v. State, 554 P.2d 411, 418 (Alaska 1976).
242. Developments in the Law, supra note 240, at 1542-44. See also Rudder v. Universal
Communications Corp. 507 So. 2d 411 (Ala. 1987); Grey v. Superior Court, 62 C.A.3d 698,
133 Cal. Rptr. (1976); People v. District Court, 719 P.2d 722 (Colo. 1986).
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Along with the idea of confidentiality, the privilege has been
justified on the grounds that it safeguards society's interest in the
mental health profession "by encouraging patients to communicate
necessary information to health professionals." 243 It has been further maintained that the privilege is necessary to insure an individual's right to privacy, 2 " which "is a fundamental tenet of the
American legal tradition, protected by common law, statutory provisions, and the Constitution." 24 5
Although psychotherapist-patient privilege statutes are not consistent in the details of their coverage,24 6 some generalizations can

243. Developments in the Law, supra note 240, at 1542.
244. For a general discussion of the privacy rationale, see Krattenmaker, TestimonialPrivileges in Federal Courts: An Alternative to the Proposed Rules of Evidence, 62 GEo. L.J. 61
(1973); Louiseli, Confidentiality, Conformity and Confusion: Privilegesin FederalCourt Today,
31 Tut. L. REV. 101 (1956).
245. Developments in the Law, supra note 240, at 1544. See In re Lifschutz, 2 Cal. 3d
415, 85 Cal. Rptr. 829, 467 P.2d 557 (1970); In re B, 482 Pa. 471, 394 A.2d 419 (1978).
246. For example Missouri's statute reads:
Any communication made by any person to a licensed psychologist in the course of
professional services rendered by the licensed psychologist shall be deemed a privileged
communication and the licensed psychologist shall not be examined or be made to
testify to any privileged communication without the prior consent of the person who
received his professional services.
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 337.055 (Vernon 1990). Florida's statute reads:
(1) For purposes of this section:
(a) A "psychotherapist" is:
1. A person authorized to practice medicine in any state or nation, or reasonably
believed by the patient so to be, 'who is engaged in the diagnosis or treatment of
a mental or emotional condition, including alcoholism and other drug addiction;
or
2. A person licensed or certified as a psychologist under the laws of any state or
nation, who is engaged primarily in the diagnosis or treatment of a mental or
emotional condition, including alcoholism and other drug addiction.
(b) A "patient" is a person who consults, or is interviewed by, a psychotherapist
for purposes of diagnosis or treatment of a mental or emotional condition, including
alcoholism and other drug addiction.
(c) A communication between psychotherapist and patient is "confidential" if it is
not intended to be disclosed to third persons other than:
1. Those persons present to further the interest of the patient in the consultation,
examination, or interview.
2. Those persons necessary for the transmission of the communication.
3. Those persons who are participating in the diagnosis and treatment under the
direction of the psychotherapist.
(2) A patient has a privilege to refuse to disclose, and to prevent any other person
from disclosing, confidential communications or records made for the purpose of di-
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be made regarding them. 47 First, a prerequisite for claiming the
privilege is that a professional relationship must exist. 248 Second,
the privilege only protects confidential information necessary for
diagnosis or treatment of the patient. 249 Third, the patient usually
controls the privilege 250 and has the exclusive power to waive it2s5

agnosis or treatment of his mental or emotional condition, including alcoholism and
other drug addiction, between himself and his psychotherapist, or persons who are
participating in the diagnosis or treatment under the direction of the psychotherapist.
This privilege includes any diagnosis made, and advice given, by the psychotherapist
in the course of that relationship.
(3) The privilege may be claimed by:
(a) The patient or his attorney on his behalf.
(b) A guardian or conservator of the patient.
(c) The personal representative of a deceased patient.
(d) The psychotherapist, but only on behalf of the patient. The authority of a psychotherapist to claim the privilege is presumed in the absence of evidence to the
contrary.
(4) There is no privilege under this section:
(a) For communications relevant to an issue in proceedings to compel hospitalization
of a patient for mental illness, if the psychotherapist in the course of diagnosis or
treatment has reasonable cause to believe the patient is in need of hospitalization.
(b) For communications made in the course of a court-ordered examination of the
mental or emotional condition of the patient.
(c) For communications relevant to an issue of the mental or emotional condition
of the patient in any proceeding in which he relies upon the condition as an element
of his claim or defense or, after the patient's death, in any proceeding in which any
party relies upon the condition as an element of his claim or defense.
FLA. AN. STAT. § 337.055 (West 1990).
247. Statutes should be examined directly for specific provisional coverage.
248. See, e.g., State v. Sands, 145 Ariz. 269, 700 P.2d 1369 (1985) (where the relationship
was held not to exist between defendant and psychotherapist who was hostage negotiator for
the police); In re Alvarez, 342 So. 2d 492 (Fla. 1977) (where relationship held not to exist when
patient was informed by psychotherapist that communication was not confidential and that patient did not have to communicate); State v. Gullekson, 383 N.W.2d 338 (Minn. App. 1986)
(where relationship did not exist because psychotherapist informed defendant communication was
subject to being disclosed).
249. See, e.g., Elliot v. Watkins Trucking Co., 406 F.2d 90 (7th Cir. 1969) (Applying Illinois
law where court held that patient's communication with psychotherapist was made during routine
admissions interview and therefore not privileged); Henson v. State, 239 Ark. 727, 393 S.W.2d
856 (1965) (where it was held that psychotherapist did not provide treatment or diagnosis); State
v. Jensen, 286 Minn. 65, 174 N.W.2d 226 (1970) (where court held that psychotherapist's purpose
in examining defendant was not that of diagnosis or treatment).
250. See, e.g., Watson v. State, 504 So. 2d 339 (Ala. App. 1986); Wilson v. Bonner, 166
Ga. App. 9, 303 S.E.2d 134 (1983); In re Adoption of Diane, 400 Mass. 196, 508 N.E.2d 837
(1987); Hampton v. Hampton, 241 Or. 277, 405 P.2d 549 (1965); Romanowicz v. Romanowicz,
213 Pa. Super. 382, 248 A.2d 238 (1968); In re Lifschutz, 2 Cal. 3d 415, 85 Cal. Rptr. 829,
467 P.2d 557 (1970).
251. See, e.g., Simek v. Superior Court, 117 C.A.3d 169, 172 Cal. Rptr. 564 (1981); Mavhttps://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss1/2
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unless an authorized representative is appointed.252 Finally, if the
privilege is waived 25 3 by the patient or an authorized representative,
the psychotherapist may not withhold confidential information obtained from the patient.254
Statutes usually provide specific exceptions to the privilege, which

require testimony from a psychotherapist, notwithstanding any objection by the patient. 25 5 Further, courts have displayed great reluctance to extend the privilege to cover communications with
individuals not specified in the statutes. 256 Moreover, in child custody
proceedings courts appear to be willing to deny the privilege to litigant-parents, if it is in the best interest of the child to do so.257
Also, in child abuse or neglect proceedings the privilege is usually
abrogated by statute.258

618 P.2d 1127 (Colo. 1980); Wray v. Dept. of Professional Regulation, 410 So. 2d 960 (Fla.
1982); Wills v. Wills, 215 Ga. 556, 111 S.E.2d 355 (1959); McGinnis v. McGinnis, 66 N.C. App.
676, 311 S.E.2d 669 (1984).
252. Nagle v. Hooks, 296 Md. 123, 460 A.2d 49 (1983); Gaertner v. State, 24 Mich. App.
503, 180 N.W.2d 308 (1970), aff'd, 385 Mich. 49, 187 N.W.2d 429 (1971).
253. Aside from a patient being able to expressly waive the privilege (In re Hochmuth, 251
N.W.2d 484 (Iowa 1977)), a patient may waive the privilege by calling the psychotherapist as
a witness (Pouncy v. State, 353 So. 2d 640 (Fla. App. 1977)), or failing to assert the privilege
upon notice of a subpoena duces tecum compelling production of mental health records (Inabnit
v. Berkson, 199 Cal. App. 3d 1230, 245 Cal. Rptr. 525 (1988)), or by asserting insanity as a
defense (Post v. State, 580 P.2d 304 (Alaska 1978)) or placing mental condition into case as a
basis for the action (Bond v. Dist. Ct., 682 P.2d 33 (Colo. 1984)).
254. See, e.g., People v. Garaux, 34 Cal. App. 3d 611, 110 Cal. Rptr. 119 (1973); People
v. Newbury, 53 Ill. 2d 228, 290 N.E.2d 592 (1972).
255. See, e.g., Harbin v. Harbin, 495 So. 2d 72 (Ala. 1986) (where mental condition of
a party in a child custody action is an issue the privilege must yield); State v. Ortiz, 144 Ariz.
582, 698 P.2d 1301 (1985) (no privilege when defendant requests mental health examination
pursuant to law); See also OxUA. STAT. Am. tit. 12, § 2503(4)(D) (West 1990); ARx. R. Evir.
503(d); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13.3734(c).
256. See, e.g., Williams v. People, 687 P.2d 950 (Colo. 1984) (where privilege did not extend
to statements made to police detective); Lipsey v. State, 170 Ga. App. 770, 318 S.E.2d 184 (1984)
(privilege not extended to counselors); State v. Sandberg, 392 N.W.2d 298 (Minn. App. 1986),
aff'd in part and rev'd on other grounds, 406 N.W.2d 506 (Minn. 1987) (where privilege was
not extended to crisis intake worker); State v. Harris, 51 Wash. App. 807, 755 P.2d 825 (1988)
(privilege not extended to mental health practitioner with B.A. degree).
257. See, e.g., Miraglia v. Miraglia, 462 So. 2d 507 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Perry v.
Fiumano, 403 N.Y.S.2d 382, 61 App; Div. 512 (1978); In re Janet D, 61 Cal. App. 3d 10, 132
Cal. Rptr. 100 (1976); Allen v. Department for Human Resources, 540 S.W.2d 597 (Ky. 1976).
258. See, e.g., In re Courtney S., 130 Cal. App. 3d 567, 181 Cal. Rptr. 843 (1982); E.H.
v. Department of Health & Rehabilitation Services, 443 So. 2d 1083 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
In re Jackson,
81 Ill.App.
136,Repository
400 N.E.2d @
1087
(1980).
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PROPOSED PSYCHOTHERAPIST-PATIENT PRIVILEOE MODEL

A.

Confidentiality and W. Va. Code 27-3-1
Before presenting the proposed model, we should first consider
the scope of protection granted to communications between mental
health professionals and patients under the "confidentiality" provision of W. VA. CODE 27-3-1. 219 Under section 27-3-1 communications between patients and mental health professionals are
considered confidential and may only be disclosed under specified
and enumerated circumstances. Although this general statement regarding section 27-3-1 may sound as though it is a psychotherapistpatient privilege, the state supreme court has ruled otherwise.
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals' first opportunity
to interpret section 27-3-1 came in State v. Simmons.260 The defen259. The section provides as follows:
§ 27-3-1 Definition of confidential information; disclosure.
(a) Communications and information obtained in the course of treatment or evaluation of any client or patient shall be deemed to be "confidential information" and
shall include the fact that a person is or has been a client or patient, information
transmitted by a patient or client or family thereof for purposes relating to diagnosis
or treatment, information transmitted by persons participating in the accomplishment
of the objectives of diagnosis or treatment, all diagnoses or opinions formed regarding
a client's or patient's physical, mental or emotional condition; any advice, instructions
or prescriptions issued in the course of diagnosis or treatment, and any record or
characterization of the matters hereinbefore described, It does not include information
which does not identify a client or patient, information from which a person acquainted
with a client or patient would not recognize such client or patient, and uncoded information from which there is no possible means to identify a client or patient.
(b) Confidential information may be disclosed:
(1) In a proceeding under section four [§ 27-5-4], article five of this chapter to
disclose the results of an involuntary examination made pursuant to sections two, three
[§§ 27-5-2, 27-5-3] or four, article five of this chapter;
(2) In a proceeding under article six-A [§ 27-6A-1 et seq.] of this chapter to disclose
the results of an involuntary examination made pursuant thereto;
(3) Pursuant to an order of any court based upon a finding that said information
is sufficiently relevant to a proceeding before the court to outweigh the importance
of maintaining the confidentiality established by this section;
(4) To protect against a clear and substantial danger of imminent injury by a
patient or client to himself or another; and
(5) For treatment or internal review purposes, to staff of the mental health facility
where the patient is being cared for or to other health professionals involved in treatment of the patient.
W. VA. CODE § 27-3-1 (1986).
260. 309 S.E.2d 89 (W. Va. 1983). The defendant in Simmons argued that a court appointed
psychiatrist violated § 27-3-1(a), by reviewing the defendant's medical record without authorization. Id. at 93.
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss1/2
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dant in Simmons was convicted of second-degree murder. On appeal
the defendant assigned as error the admission of testimony by a
court-appointed psychiatrist. One of the issues raised on appeal,
regarding the psychiatrist's testimony, involved section 27-3-1. The
defendant contended that the psychiatrist violated the section by
examining prior medical records of the defendant. The court first
noted that the issue was not objected to at trial. Further, the court
pointed out that the defendant opened up the issue of his mental
health by raising an insanity defense. The court then went on to
make a determination of whether or not the statute created a psychotherapist-patient privilege. The court concluded .that the statute
did not create a psychotherapist-patient privilege, based upon its
finding that the statute "does, not define the relationship it is intended to protect, identifies only one party, i.e., the client or patient,
and is written so broadly that the confidentiality is not limited to
information essential to any confidential relationship." 261 While we
agree with the court that the statute is written broadly and that it
does not create "any sort of a general psychotherapist-patient privilege, ' 262 we believe the court could have used the Simmons case as
an opportunity to create a common law psychotherapist-patient privilege under the authority given to the court in Rule 501 of the West
Virginia Rules of Evidence. 263 Our observation here is not without
precedent. The circumstances that the court confronted in Simmons
were quite similar to the situation facing the Alaska Supreme Court
in Allred v. State.26
The defendant in Allred was indicted for first degree murder.
Prior to the indictment, the defendant confessed to a psychiatric
social worker that he committed the murder the police had been
questioning him about. Immediately after the confession to the
psychiatric social worker, the defendant was indicted for murder.

261. Id. at 96.
262. Id.

263. Rule 501 provides: "The privilege of a witness, person, government, state, or political
subdivision thereof shall be governed by the principles of the common law except as modified

by the Constitution of the United States or West Virginia, statute or court rule." W.v.R.E.
501.
264. 554 P.2d 411 (Alaska 1976).
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At trial the defense attempted unsuccessfully to suppress the confession made to the psychiatric social worker by asserting that all
communications made to the psychiatric social worker were privileged under a confidentiality statute which protected communication
between psychotherapists and patients. Although the trial court allowed the psychiatric social worker to testify concerning the communication with the defendant, the case ended in mistrial after the
jury was unable to reach a verdict. The Alaska Supreme Court
granted review with respect to the issue of whether a psychotherapistpatient privilege had been created by the confidentiality statute.
The court in Allred was not hesitant in finding that the confidentiality statute was not intended to provide an evidentiary privilege. The court stated that "[tihe provision nowhere states that it
was intended as creating a privilege. It does not refer to courtroom
testimony. The general thrust of its language seems to point towards
'anti-gossip' considerations ....

It is only as an 'anti-gossip' meas-

ure that [the statute] makes sense.'

'265

After dispensing with the confidentiality statute as a mere "antigossip" provision, the court addressed the issue of whether a psychotherapist-patient privilege should be created. In doing this, the
court analyzed the issue using Dean Wigmore's four canons. 66 Upon
concluding its analysis, the court held that it would "recognize a
common law privilege, belonging to the patient, which protects communications made to psychotherapists in the course of treatment. 267
The court also formulated a test to be used in determining when
its common law psychotherapist-patient privilege should apply.2 68
Although the court in Allred was not unanimous as to whether
or not its new common law privilege protected the communication
made by the defendant to the psychiatric social worker, nevertheless
the privilege was held to apply. 269

265.
266.
267.
268.
269.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.at
Id.at

415.
417-18.
418.
421.
422.
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The facts of the Simmons case suggest that if the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals had created a common law privilege, its
scope probably would not have protected the information the defendant sought to suppress. More than likely, the defendant's introduction of his mental condition into the case and the fact that
the psychiatrist's access to his confidential records was pursuant to
a court-ordered examination, probably would have been construed
as sufficient cause to preclude application of the privilege. 270 Notwithstanding the strong possibility that the privilege would not have
applied in Simmons, it would have been applicable in State v. All27
man. 1
In Allman the defendant was convicted of six counts of first
degree sexual assault. The victim in the case was the granddaughter
of the defendant. The victim was not older than fifteen at the time
of the sexual assaults. On appeal, the defense argued as error the
trial court's refusal to allow the victim's psychological records to
be reviewed by the defense. The court held that it was reversible
error not to allow the defense an opportunity to review the psychological records of the victim. The court based its decision on
one of the exceptions to confidentiality under section 27-3-1 of the
Code. 272
The facts of Allman, as given in the opinion, strongly suggest
that the court would not have ordered that the victim's psychological
records be disclosed if a common law psychotherapist-patient privilege had been in existence. The way that the opinion reads, it appears that the defense wanted to examine the victim's past
psychological records as well as have the trial court order the victim
to undergo a psychological examination. The victim, it appears, did
not make her mental health an issue. The defense made the matter
an issue. If a psychotherapist-patient privilege was in existence, the
proper ruling in this case would have upheld the trial court's decision
not to allow the defense to look at the victim's past psychological
record.
270. Of course, this is sheer speculation. It is possible that the court could have created

a privilege whose scope would have embraced the issues of the case.
271. 352 S.E.2d 116 (V. Va. 1986).
272. The decision was based on § 27-3-1(b)(3). See supra note 259.
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B. ProposedPsychotherapist-PatientPrivilege
Privacy is not a penumbral emanation of the Constitution, it is
the very ground of constitutional government. Privacy preexists all
constitutions and fingers the rights humankind hold with authority
beyond the reach of constitutional forums. Certain avenues of privacy in our society require special protections, and those protections
must come in the form of privileges. For some time the growth of
the mental health sciences has outstripped society's ability in general
to comprehend it. In the past, the father (sometimes mother), the
priest or equivalent was the first and final aid to mental disorders.
Mental illness was the last bastion of spiritual demons in medical
history.
Today, we know very differently. It is much less a stigma today
to see a psychiatrist, or talk about your therapy to your co-workers
and family. Businesses do not scurry you out the door for fear that
a sudden cosmic event will destroy their welfare. But in the West
Virginia legal system, we still do not fully appreciate what mental
health therapists do. We have not recognized the crucial and critical
value of psychiatrists and psychologists. This we need to do. Our
people require a better understanding from our legislature and courts
because in so many ways that are ultimately tangible in the expression of a human life the psychologist and psychiatrist have taken
the place of priest and even family. The purpose of this privilege
is not to let mentally ill criminals free. It is to recognize the fundamental value of mental health in our society and keep government
away from that ground of privacy modern medicine has unearthed:
an avenue of privacy which in the past we gave other names.
The psychotherapist-patient privilege is necessary both as a means
of protecting the patient's right of privacy and as a means of protecting society's important interest in fostering effective psychotherapy. Except in those cases where the patient's right to privacy
is outweighed by important competing interests, the patient who
consults a psychotherapist has a right, which the law should protect,
to prevent the public disclosure in the courtroom of private information provided to the therapist in confidence during therapy. The
psychotherapist-patient privilege is needed to prevent such disclosure
from occurring without the patient's consent. Society also has an
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss1/2
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interest in encouraging persons who need psychotherapy to divulge
to therapists whatever information the therapists must have in order
to render effective treatment. Unless the state adopts a psychotherapist-patient privilege, patients might hesitate to seek treatment
for fear that private and personal information divulged to the therapist during psychotherapy may be disclosed to others during courtroom proceedings.
"An individual's right of privacy is a fundamental tenet of the
American legal tradition protected by common law, statutory provisions, and the Constitution." 273 The common law of torts, for
example, may impose liability for invasion of privacy in cases where
embarrassing private facts that are not of legitimate public concern
have been disclosed to the public. 274 The Privacy Act of 1974275 provides for the establishment by federal agencies of special procedures
for the disclosure of medical records. The Fourth Amendment to
the Constitution, which protects the individual's right of privacy
against unreasonable search and seizure, has also been held to prohibit the government from making unauthorized recordings of private conversations. 276 The constitutional protection extends to those
areas within which the individual has justifiably relied upon an
"expectation[] of privacy. ' 277 These are just a few of the many ways
in which American law protects various aspects of the individual's
right to privacy.
The privacy interests that are implicated in the psychotherapistpatient relationship are similar to and just as deserving of legal protection as the other privacy interests which are already protected by
West Virginia and federal law:
Patients entering a psychotherapeutic relationship ...

have a reasonable expec-

tation of privacy in the communications they make to their psychotherapists.
Psychotherapy requires that patients fully disclose extremely personal and sensitive
information. Compelled disclosure of information communicated by a patient to

273. Developments in the Law-Privileged Communications, 98 H/Av. L. REV. 1450, 1544

(1985).
274.
275.
276.
277.

See REsTATEmENT (SEcoND) oF ToRTs § 652D (1976).
5 U.S.C. § 552a(f)(3) (1988).
See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967).
United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971).
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a psychotherapist will therefore often threaten the privacy of the patient's most
intimate thoughts.",

Quoting from a leading treatise on law and psychiatry, the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia explained what
is at stake for the patient as follows: "The psychiatric patient confides more utterly than anyone else in the world. He exposes to the
therapist not only what his words directly express; he lays bare his
' 27 9
entire self, his dreams, his fantasies, his sins, and his shame.
Accordingly, some courts have held that the psychotherapist-patient
relationship falls within the zone of privacy that is protected by the
Constitution. 280 Even if the psychotherapist-patient privilege is not
understood to have constitutional underpinnings, however, the right
of privacy that it protects is surely deserving of statutory protection.
The second justification for the psychotherapist-patient privilege
is utilitarian. The privilege is "necessary to protect society's interest
in ... counseling relationships by encouraging patients to communicate necessary information" to psychotherapists. 28' In many
types of psychotherapy, patients must fully disclose highly personal
information in order for treatment to be effective. Also, persons
who consult a psychotherapist face the prospect of social stigmatization or discrimination.
[B]ecause the information divulged during treatment is so personal and because
there is still some stigma attached to seeking psychotherapeutic treatment, a patient might hesitate to seek treatment and disclose information about herself if
there were any danger that the information could be disclosed outside the bounds
2
of the psychotherapist-patient relationship.?

278. Developments in the Law, supra note 273, at 1547.
279. Taylor v. United States, 222 F.2d 398, 401 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (quoting M. GUrrMACHER
& H. W-mormr, PsYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 272 (1952)).
280. See In re Lifschultz, 2 Cal. 3d 415, 431-32, 467 P.2d 557, 567, 85 Cal. Rptr. 829,
839 (1970) ("In Griswold v. Connecticut ... the United States Supreme Court declared that
'[v]arious guarantees [of the Bill of Rights] create zones of privacy,' and we believe that the
confidentiality of the psychotherapeutic session falls within one such zone."); In re B, 482 Pa.
471, 484, 394 A.2d 419, 425 (1978) ("[I]n Pennsylvania, an individual's interest in preventing
the disclosure of information revealed in the context of a psychotherapist-patient relationship
has deeper roots than the ... privilege statute, and ... the patient's right to prevent disclosure
of such information is constitutionally based.").
281. Developments in the Law, supra note 273, at 1542.
282. Id. at 1543 (footnotes omitted).
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Most patients know that if they undergo psychotherapy, they will
be expected to divulge very private information and that they cannot
obtain therapeutic help except on that condition. "It would be too
much to expect them to [undergo treatment] if they knew that all
they say - and all that the psychiatrist learns from what they say
- may be revealed to the whole world from a witness stand." 23
In addition, "psychotherapy depends on the patient's trust in the
therapist built up slowly in a- secure context. In the absence of a
strong feeling of security, the patient will not even be able to recall
past experiences, much less respond fully to treatment.'28
The public benefits in two ways from "encouraging the psychologically handicaj~ped to seek and fully cooperate in psychotherapeutic counseling." The community obviously benefits from the successful treatment of mentally ill persons
who pose a possible danger to society. Furthermore, mentally fit individuals have

greater capacities for economic, emotional, and political productivity than mentally disabled persons.n

A state can protect its interest in psychotherapy by adopting the
psychotherapist-patient privilege, which reassures those who might
be considering psychotherapy that they can have confidence in their
therapist and that any private information they might divulge to the
therapist during the treatment will not be disclosed in courtroom
proceedings except in certain specified circumstances in which it is
reasonable to allow such disclosure.
Historically, the psychotherapist-patient privilege is an outgrowth
of the physician-patient privilege, 28 6 and most of the states that have
enacted the former have also enacted the latter. 28 7 But it does not
follow from the fact that a state has established a psychotherapistpatient privilege that it must also adopt a physician-patient privilege.
283. Taylor, 222 F.2d at 401 (quoting M. GuTrmAcHEi & H. WEMomu, supra note 277,
at 272).
284. Louisell & Sinclair, The Supreme Court of California, 1969-70 Foreword: Reflections
on the Law of PrivilegedCommunications the Psychotherapist-PatientPrivilege in Perspective,
CALnF. L. Rav. 30, 52 (1971).
285. Comment, Psychotherapist-PatientPrivilege Under FederalRule of Evidence 501, 75
J. Cam. L. & CunMNoLoGY 388, 393 (1984) (quoting In re Zuniga, 714 F.2d 632, 639 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 983 (1983)).
286. See R. SLovENKo, PSYCmATRY AND LAW 61-62 (1973).
287. See Hayden, Should There Be a PsychotherapistPrivilege in Military Courts-Martial?,
123 Mn.. L. Rav. 31, 95-101 (1989).
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As of 1989, at least eight states had enacted either a psychotherapistpatient privilege or a psychiatrist-patient privilege without also having enacted a physician-patient privilege.28 Moreover, "some courts,
commentators, and legislatures have found the psychotherapist- patient privilege more defensible than the physician-patient privilege." 9 Both the right-to-privacy and the utilitarian justifications
are stronger when applied to the psychotherapist- patient relationship
than when applied to the physician-patient relationship. Thus, there
are ample grounds on which a state might decide to adopt the psychotherapist-patient privilege while at the same'time reject the physician-patient privilege.
As to the right of privacy, this right would be much less endangered if there were no physician-patient privilege than if there
were no psychotherapist-patient privilege. In the first place, "[t]he
patient ... has a legitimate interest in protecting information about
psychiatric treatment because of the social stigma attached to such
treatment .... This social stigma is not attached to the physically
ill, or at least not to the same degree.' '290 Second, whereas
"[i]nformation from psychotherapy is among the most highly personal information imaginable ... [m]edical treatment deals less fre291
quently with highly personal information.1
The utilitarian case for a physician-patient privilege is also much
weaker than the utilitarian case for a psychotherapist- patient privilege. Whereas the unavailability of the psychotherapist-patient privilege would almost certainly deter patients from undertaking
psychotherapy, the unavailability of the physician-patient privilege
would be very unlikely to deter patients from obtaining medical
treatment. Dean Wigmore explains why this is so:
(1) In only a few instances, out of the thousands daily occurring, is the fact
communicated to a physician confidential in any real sense.... Most of one's
ailments are immediately disclosed and discussed....

288. The eight states are Alabama, Connecticut, Florida, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Mexico and Tennessee. See id.
289. Developments in the Law, supra note 240, at 1548 (footnote omitted).
290. Comment, The Psychotherapist-PatientPrivilege in FederalCourts, 59 NoR DAME
L. Rnv. 791, 797-98 (1984).
291. Smith, Medical and PsychotherapyPrivileges and Confidentiality: On Giving with One
Hand and Removing with the Other, 75 Ky. L.J. 473, 478 (1987).
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss1/2
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(2) Even where the disclosure to the physician is actually confidential, it would
nonetheless be made though no privilege existed. People would not be deterred
2
from seeking medical help because of the possibility of disclosure in court.m

In addition, "[m]ore than a century of experience with the statutes
has demonstrated that the [physician-patient] privilege in the main
operates not as the shield of privacy but as the protector of fraud."

293

Persuaded by such arguments as these, a number of courts have
recognized that the case for a psychotherapist-patient privilege is
much more compelling than the case for a physician-patient privilege. 294
Although Dean Wigmore did not apply his four canons for determining an evidentiary privilege to the psychotherapist- patient re-

lationship, we contend the relationship satisfies his canons. First,
the average patient enters the relationship with an expectation that
communication with a psychotherapist will not*be disclosed. 295 It is
common knowledge that a psychotherapist probes at aspects of an
individual's life that are sensitively private, that is, experiences a
patient has had which he or she may not have ever revealed to
anyone. The average patient goes into this relationship knowing that

he or she must confess what he or she once thought was unconfessable. In pouring out, laying bare the flesh of his or her soul,
the patient's only connection with certainty is the expectation that
the psychotherapist will be the only person who knows the mental
or emotional problems that plagued him or her.

292. 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 2380a, at 829 (J. McNaughton
rev. ed. 1961); see also Chafee, Privileged Communications: Is Justice Served or Obstructed by
Closing the Doctor's Mouth on the Witness Stand?,, 52 YALE L.J. 607, 609 (1943) ("[M]edical
treatment is so valuable that few would lose it to prevent facts from coming to light in court.
Indeed, it may be doubted whether, except for a small range of disgraceful or peculiarly private
matters, patients worry much about having a doctor keep their private affairs concealed from
the world.").
293. C. MCCORMCK, EVmENCE § 105, at 228 (E. Cleary 2d ed. 1972).
294. See Lora v. Board of Educ., 74 F.R.D. 565, 575 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) ("[I]t is desirable
as a matter of social policy to protect psychotherapist-patient confidences by an evidentiary
privilege .... In this respect, the specialized psychotherapist-patient relationship is significantly
distinguishable from the relation between physicians and patients generally."); State v. Aucoin,
362 So. 2d 503, 505 (La. 1978) (physician-patient privilege "has been severely criticized," but
"[ifnthe case of communications to psychiatrists ... the need for the privilege is clear").
295. 8 J. WiaMo.E, supra note 95, at 101.
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Second, the element of confidentiality is essential to the complete
and satisfactory maintenance of the relationship. 296 It is extremely
doubtful that any patient would maintain an honest and open relationship with a psychotherapist if he or she knew that his or her
honesty and openness was subject to disclosure. The average patient,
if he or she did not terminate or refuse to enter the relationship,
would probably lie or conceal pertinent information from the psychotherapist.
Third, the relationship is one that society believes is worth fostering. 297 Evidence of the value placed on the relationship by society
is readily apparent in the fact that forty-nine states have enacted
statutes making the relationship privileged. Society's approval of the
relationship could not be expressed any stronger.
Lastly, the injury to the relationship from compelled disclosure
far outweighs the benefit a court would gain from receiving the
communication as evidence. 298 Information that psychotherapists solicit from patients has unquestioned value and relevancy in the context of psychotherapy. The oftentimes vague, unconnected and surreal
data that psychotherapists extract from patients become real and
hard facts for psychotherapists. Such information is little understood
by laypersons. Placing psychotherapy data in front of a trier of fact
is often a meaningless exercise. However, compelling disclosure of
a patient's communication with a psychotherapist can lead to the
destruction of the relationship and could cause potential patients to
refrain from seeking out needed psychotherapeutic help.
It will be noted here that the proposed psychotherapist- patient
privilege model excludes a physician who is not engaged in the diagnosis or treatment of a patient for a mental or emotional condition. That is, the model does not propose a physician-patient
privilege be created. 299 The physician-patient privilege satisfies only

296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. For a general discussion contrasting the psychotherapist- patient privilege and physician-patient privilege, see Gellman, Prescribing Privacy: The Uncertain Role of the Physician
of Patient Privacy, 62 N.C.L. REv. 255 (1984); Guttmacher & Weihofen, Privileged Commu-
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two of Dean Wigmore's four canons: confidentiality is expected by
3°
the patient, and the relationship is one that society should foster.
As previously stated, it is doubtful that confidentiality is necessary for the maintenance of most physician-patient relationships.
A patient is not likely to terminate his or her relationship with a
physician because of evidentiary testimony regarding a physical injury. Any harm that would occur to the relationship would be greater
than the benefit gained by disclosure in a courtroom. Common sense
dictates that the general public would not stop going to physicians
because of the possibility that their physical injuries would be made
known in a court of law. With rare exceptions, physical injuries
have never carried stigmatism or caused irreparable embarrassment
due to disclosure.
For the purpose of statutory enactment, it is recommended that
ten, article three,
the below proposed privilege be placed at section
30 1
Code:
Virginia
West
the
chapter fifty-seven of
Section 57-3-10. Psychotherapist-PatientPrivilege
A.

Definitions. For the purposes of this section:

1. A "psychotherapist" is:
(a) A person authorized to practice medicine in any state or nation [or
reasonably believed by the patient so to be] who is engaged in the diagnosis or
treatment of a mental or emotional condition, including alcoholism and other
drug addiction.
(b) A person licensed or certified as a psychologist under the laws of any
state or nation [or reasonably believed by the patient so to be] who is engaged

nications Between Psychiatristand Patient, 28 IND. L.J. 32 (1952); Hayden, Should There Be
a PsychotherapistPrivilege in Military Courts-Martial, 123 Mm. L. Rav. 31 (1989); Knapp &
VandeCreek, PrivilegedCommunicationsfor Psychotherapistsin Pennsylvania:A Time for Statutory Reform, 60 TEMP. L.Q. 267 (1987); Slovenko, Psychiatry and a Second Look at the Medical
Privilege, 6 WAYNE L. RPv. 175 (1960).
300. See Note, The Casefor a FederalPsychotherapist-PatientPrivilege that Protects Patient Identity, 1985 DUKE L.J. 1217 (1985).
301. This recommendation is being made primarily because the privilege includes psychiatrists and psychologists. It is therefore, perhaps, more appropriate to place the privilege in
the neutral "Competency of Witnesses" section of the Code, as opposed to placing it in the
sections dealing with psychologists or physicians.
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in the diagnosis or treatment of a mental or emotional condition, including alcoholism and other drug addiction.2. A "patient" is a person who consults, or is interviewed by, a psychotherapist
for purposes of diagnosis or treatment of a mental or emotional condition, including alcoholism and other drug addiction.m
3. "Communications" includes conversations, correspondence, actions, and occurrences relating to diagnosis or treatment, regardless of the patient's awareness
of such conversations, correspondence, actions, and occurrences, and any records,
memoranda, or notes of the foregoing.3
4. A communication between psychotherapist and patient is "confidential"
it is not intended to be disclosed to third persons other than:

if

(a) Those persons present; including family members, to further the interest
of the patient in the consultation, examination, or interview.
(b) Those persons necessary for the transmission of the communication.
(c) Those persons who are participating in the diagnosis and treatment of
the patient under the direction of the psychotherapist or reasonably believed to
be so by the patient.
B. General Rule of Privilege. In civil and criminal cases, in proceedings preliminary thereto, and in legislative and administrative proceedings, a patient has a
privilege to refuse to disclose, and to prevent any other person from disclosing,
confidential communications, wherever made, relating to diagnosis or treatment

302. The definition of psychotherapist includes a medical doctor who is involved in diagnosing or treating mental or emotional conditions, including alcoholism and other drug addiction, so as not to exclude the general practitioner and to avoid making unnecessary distinctions
about what is and is not the practice of psychiatry. The requirement that a psychologist be
licensed or certified is in keeping with the current standard of the state of West Virginia. It is
also deemed necessary and fair to extend the privilege to a patient who has been misled as to
the qualifications of the psychotherapist. That is, if the patient reasonably believes the psychotherapist has met the qualifications to perform the services needed, the patient should not be
deprived of the privilege if it is later discovered that the psychotherapist was not authorized,
licensed or certified to perform the services needed.
303. The definition of patient is meant to include a person seeking diagnosis or treatment
for a mental or emotional condition, including alcoholism and other drug addiction, but is not
meant to include the individual who consults a psychotherapist for business or other professional
purposes. This exclusion would also extend to the individual who is submitting to an examination
for scientific purposes.
304. The definition of communication is meant to include all information, regardless of
how it is gathered, and irrespective of whether it comes from words or actions of an active
patient or from a patient who is unconscious.
305. Communication which would be considered confidential is that which is made in the
interest of diagnosis or treatment by the psychotherapist and not intended for general dissemination. This subsection also permits a psychotherapist to engage the services of individuals who
are necessary for adequate diagnosis or treatment without destroying the concept of confidentiality.
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss1/2
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of the patient's mental or emotional condition between patient and psychotherapist, or between members of the patient's family and the psychotherapist, or
between any of the foregoing and such persons who participate, under the supervision of, or in cooperation with, the psychotherapist in the accomplishment
of the objectives of diagnosis or treatment.0
C. Who May Claim the Privilege. The patient or the patient's attorney on behalf
of the patient; a guardian or conservator of the patient; the personal representative
of a deceased patient; the psychotherapist, but only on behalf of the patient;
further, the authority of a psychotherapist to claim the privilege is presumed in
absence of evidence to the contrary.3
D.

3

Exceptions to a Claim of Privilege. 0

1. Condition an Element of Claim or Defense. There is no privilege under this
section as to a communication relevant to an issue of the mental or emotional
condition of the patient in any proceeding in which the patient relies upon the
condition as an element of his or her claim or defense, or, after the patient's
death, in any proceeding in which any party relies upon the condition as an
element of his or her claim or defense.3 0
2. Examination by Order of Court. If the court orders an examination of the
mental or emotional condition of a patient, whether a party or witness, communications made in the course thereof are not privileged under this section with

306. This subsection is meant to convey that the privilege extends to all proceedings. It is
also the intent here to prevent the "eavesdropper" exception, which some courts acknowledge,
from destroying the privilege. That is, preventing the testimony of someone who secretly obtained
information revealed confidentially between patient and psychotherapist. Further, this subsection
makes privileged communication that takes place anywhere that would not be considered patently
public. It is further intended that the privilege be extended to communications between the
psychotherapist and members of the patient's family, when such communication is necessary for
the diagnosis or treatment of the patient. Where the psychotherapist finds it necessary to communicate with other professionals in diagnosing or treating the patient, such communication,
however transmitted, is intended to be privileged by this subsection.
307. The privilege is intended to be controlled by the patient and for the benefit of the
patient. If circumstances arise and the patient is unable to assert the privilege, this subsection
makes it clear that a guardian, conservator, or the patient's attorney may assert the privilege
on behalf of the patient. Where a patient is deceased, it is intended that the deceased patient's
personal representative be allowed to assert the privilege in a manner reasonably to be expected
by the patient if he or she lived. The psychotherapist is also intended to be able to assert the
privilege on behalf of the patient in any proceeding.
308. The exceptions to the privilege are intended to be narrowly interpreted and where
doubt arises as to whether or not an exception applies, it is intended that the privilege be given
greater weight to exclude the doubtful exception.
309. This subsection is intended to prevent a patient from introducing his or her mental
or emotional condition into a proceeding, and then invoking the privilege to preclude the other
side from having access to communication regarding his or her mental or emotional condition.
It is intended that the judge or presiding officer make a preliminary investigation as to whether
or not a just resolution of the case demands that the communication in whole or in part be
disclosed.
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respect to the particular purpose for which the, examination is ordered, but this
excludes any admissions of guilt.310
3. Proceedingsfor Hospitalization. When a psychotherapist, in the course of
diagnosis or treatment of the patient, finds it necessary to disclose such communication either for the purpose of placing the patient in a hospital for mental
illness or for the purpose of retaining the patient in a hospital for mental illness,
31
the privilege is not applicable.
4. Imminent Danger. When a psychotherapist, in the course of diagnosis or
treatment of the patient, finds it necessary to disclose such communication either
for the purpose of placing the patient under arrest or under the supervision of
law enforcement authorities because of the threat of imminently dangerous activity
by the patient against him/herself or another person, the privilege is not appli3 12
cable.
5. Crime or Fraud. The privilege afforded by this section is not applicable if
the services of the psychotherapist were sought, obtained or used to enable or
aid anyone to commit or plan a crime or fraud, or to escape detection or apprehension after the commission of a crime or fraud."'
6. Psychotherapist-PatientLitigation. The privilege afforded by this section is
not applicable in any proceeding between the patient and the psychotherapist in
24
which disclosure is reasonably necessary to a defense of the psychotherapist.
E. This section is in addition to the protection afforded pursuant to section one,
article three, chapter twenty-seven of this Code.

Historically, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has
refused to recognize privileges that did not exist under common law,
a statute or the West Virginia Constitution. 3 5 But the Judicial Reorganization Amendment and Rule 501 of the West Virginia Rules
310. An exception to the privilege is present when a judge orders an evaluation of the
mental or emotional condition of the patient. However, the privilege remains and protects those
communications which are made during a court-ordered evaluation, but are not relevant to the
purpose for which the evaluation was ordered. It is also intended that the privilege remain and
protect communication made during the evaluation which is self-incriminating.
311. This exception to the privilege is applicable only when involuntary commitment is
reasonably believed to be necessary to protect the patient or others. Further, where involuntary
retention is reasonably believed to be necessary, this exception applies.
312. Where a patient presents imminent danger to him/herself or to others, and it is reasonably believed that intervention by law enforcement officials is necessary to prevent the said
danger, the privilege does not apply.
313. This exception is intended to prevent the services of a psychotherapist from being
utilized for the purpose of planning or committing a crime or fraud, or shielding crime or fraud
after the fact.
314. This exception permits the psychotherapist to reveal confidential communication in
defense of him/herself, in a proceeding between the psychotherapist and patient.
315. Mohr v. Mohr, 119 W. Va. 253, 256, 193 S.E. 121, 122 (1937).
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of Evidence (W.V.R.E.) have rendered prior legal precedent obsolete.
There are four ways to create new privileges. First, there can be
a constitutional amendment. Second, a privilege may be found in
a statute from the legislature. Third, the Supreme Court of Appeals
can judicially legislate a new privilege under its constitutional authority. Here, the court would act with the same authority by which
it creates and amends the Rules of Evidence. 16 Fourth, Rule 501 of
the W.V.R.E. gives both the court of appeals and the circuit courts
case-by-case authority to create and apply privileges. And while one
might argue that Rule 501 of the W.V.R.E. merely restates prior
existing common law on privileges, a fair and reasonable approach
to Rule 501 clearly shows it does not restrict privileges to their existence under common law. Rather, the creation of a new privilege
is "governed by the principles of the common law." Federal courts
to substantially expand or
in the past have used similar language
317
privileges.
law
restrict common
W.V.R.E. 501 and F.R.E. 501 differ but not to the extent their
meanings negate one another. Like its federal counterpart, W.V.R.E.
501 manifests a desire not to freeze the law of privilege but rather
to provide the courts with the flexibility to develop rules of privilege
on a case-by-case basis. Clearly, the liberal creation of new privileges
is not always desirable, but where the legislature has failed to create
privileges and confidential statutes in particularly sensitive areas, a
318
court should have little reluctance to act.

316. The West Virginia Rules of Evidence contain the following:
Rule 101. Scope. These rules govern proceedings in the courts of this State to the
extent and with the exceptions stated in Rule 1101. Rules of evidence set forth in any
West Virginia statute not in conflict with any of these rules or any other rules adopted
by the Supreme Court of Appeals shall be deemed to be in effect until superseded by
rule or decision of the Supreme Court of Appeals.
W.V.R.E. 101.
Clearly, this rule demonstrates the paramount role of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in establishing rules of evidence.
317. See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980)(a decision substantially altering the
federal husband-wife privilege).
318. But see, University of Penn. v. EEOC, 110 S. Ct. 577, 582, (1990) the Court was
asked to create a new privilege under Rule 501. The University argued that an "academic freedom" privilege should be declared to protect information submitted in peer review cases. The
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In the power to create privileges, the independence of the West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals exceeds that of most state and
federal courts. Article 8 of the West Virginia Constitution gives the
Supreme Court of Appeals the power to create rules of procedure/
evidence without giving the executive or legislative branches powers
to appeal or review. Should the Supreme Court of Appeals create
a privilege, it would require a constitutional amendment to erase its
effect. The court has recently exercised that authority in the case
of State ex rel. Hudok v. Henry.31 9
Since privileges are expressions of substantial public policy, courts
should initially defer to legislative wisdom unless the legislative inaction is irresponsible. The psychotherapist-patient privilege is a
Court rejected the invitation:
We do not create and apply an evidentiary privilege unless it "promotes sufficiently
important interests to outweight the need for probative evidence ....

"

Tramel v.

United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51, 100 S. Ct. 906, 912, 63 L.Ed.2d 186 (1980). Inasmuch
as [t]estimonial exclusionary rules and privileges contravene the fundamental principle
that 'the public ... has a right to every man's evidence,' id., at 50, 100 S. Ct. at
912, quoting United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331, 70 S. Ct. 724, 730, 94 L.Ed.
884 (1950), any such privilege must be strictly construed. 445 U.S., at 50, 100 S. Ct.
at 912.
Moreover, although Rule 501 manifests a congressional desire not to freeze the law
of privilege but rather to provide the courts with flexibility to develop rules of privilege
on a case-by-case basis, id. at 47, 100 S. Ct. at 910, we are disinclined to exercise
this authority expansively. We are especially reluctant to recognize a privilege in an
area where it appears that Congress has considered the relevant competing concerns
but has not provided the privilege itself. Cf. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 706,
92 S. Ct. 2646, 2669, 33 L.Ed.2d 626 (1972). The balancing of conflicting interests
of this type is particularly a legislative function.
With all this in mind, we cannot accept the University's invitation to create a new
privilege against the disclosure of peer review materials. We begin by noting that Congress, in extending Title VII to educational institutions and in providing for broad
EEOC subpoena powers, did not see fit to create a privilege for peer review documents.
319. Without citing its recent source of authority for the creation of new privileges (WVRE
501), the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, relying upon the First Amendment and the
West Virginia Constitution, Article III, § 7, extended a qualified privilege to media reporters:
To protect the important public interest of reporters in their news-gathering functions
under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, disclosure of a reporter's
confidential sources or news-gathering materials may not be compelled except upon a
clear and specific showing that the information is highly material and relevant, necessary or critical to the maintenance of the claim, and not obtainable from other
available sources.
Ex rel. Hudok v. Henry, 389 S'E.2d 188, 199 (W. Va. 1989).
The court makes it clear that where the reporter is not engaged in a news-gathering function,
he is subject to giving testimony as to what he observed to the same extent as any other witness.
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gravely important one. It embraces the progressive wisdom of a
society, and thus we believe it is best expressed by the legislature.
The legislature has specifically created privileges for professional
counselors32° and social workers. 321 In contrast to psychotherapy, these
fields do not have the depth of contact with people nor require the
depth of education and training. 322 These points were distinguished
by the Alaska Supreme Court when it stated, "It appears to us that
there is a substantial difference between the activities comprehended
under the term 'psychotherapy' and those covered by the fields of
counseling and psychiatric social work.., counseling is aimed not
primarily at uncovering deep psychological processes but at enabling
323
the client to make more effective use of his present resources.1
Although it is recommended that this new privilege be approved
by the legislature, the role of the court will remain critical. It has
shown its capacity to identify and dramatize problems in the evidence area; this role is an essential catalyst for continued reform.
The courts will have to make the ultimate decisions of how this
newly created privilege will be interpreted and applied. Nevertheless,
its role is better adapted to review than to initiation. As in this
instance, where categorical rules involving substantial public policy
are needed, it is better for the legislature to formulate them.
This is a privilege which protects the place in our people's psyche
where they dream. It is the primal font of social health and individual happiness. That area mandates protection, and to achieve that
protection mandates the attention and direction of the legislature.

320. W. VA. CODE § 30-31-13 (1986).
321. W. VA. CODE § 30-30-12 (1986).

322. At the same time, it is clear that communications made to professionals who are not
psychotherapists but provide similar counseling services, such as social workers, marriage counselors, and rap counselers, should remain privileged. The problems people bring to these professional couselors are often the same problems brought to psychotherapists; the need for trust

and full disclosure is the same, and an identical privacy interest is involved. Furthermore, denying
a privilege to communications made to these professional counselors while granting a privilege
to psychotherapist-patient communications harms only those who cannot afford the services of

a psychotherapist.
323. Allred v. State, 554 P.2d 411, 418-19 (1976).
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